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MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

Mr. Seward, having courageously ended the Trent affair to the satisfactionof the public, now recovered from its first attack of folly, the only obstacle tobe feared—the danger of a maritime war—was finally removed. Burnsideembarked at New York, during the early days of 1862, with the little armythat should seize Roanoke and march on the interior of North Carolina [see Vol. I., p. 632]. The troops destined for the attack on New Orleans were sent to Ship Island in detail. But an unusually severe winter followed.While the naval expeditions intended to land troops on the coasts of theSouthern States might still have been fitted out, though the severe galesof the season would have subjected them to serious danger, deep snowsand intense cold made movements on the part of the Army of the Potomacnext to impossible. Even had it been desirable to expose raw troops to therigors of a winter campaign, it would have been impracticable to provision anadvancing army, on account of the impassable condition of the roads. Thisset McClellan , as well as many of his subordinates, to thinking of transporta-tion by water, down the Western rivers, or through the deep estuaries ofEastern Virginia.

One day, I think it was the 20th of December, General McClellan , ordinarilyso assiduous, did not appear at headquarters. The next day it was learnedthat he was ill. Three days later his life was in danger. Exhausted withwork, his robust physique was seized with a typhoid of the most serioustype. . . . His absence paralyzed work at headquarters. He had not

regularly delegated his powers. His father-in-law and chief of staff, GeneralMarcy, did not dare to act definitively in his name. McClellan had made themistake of not creating a general field-staff service, with a duly appointedchief of staff. This might have aided hi m in seeming a consistent ensembleof military operations. . . . On his return to the duties of his office

[January 13], he realized that during his absence important changes hadbeen arranged. On the 15th of January, Mr. Cameron was superseded byMr. Stanton, a celebrated lawyer, who was spoken of as one of the comingmen of the Democratic party. McClellan , who knew and appreciated him,had, before his illness, contributed materially to Stanton’s nomination byrecommending him earnestly to the President. But he was not slow toregret this. Mr. Stanton, endowed with a remarkable faculty for work, ren-dered incontestable service in. the organization of the armies; but, fearingthe growing importance of those who commanded them, and wishing toimpose his authority, he was instrumental, more than any one else, indeveloping in Mr. Lincoln’s mind the idea of directing military operationsin person, from the depths of the White House itself. The personal inter-vention of the President, provoked by the inconsiderate impatience of thepublic and the precipitate solicitations of McClellan ’s political adversaries,first declared itself in a singular order, kept a secret as regards the public atthe time, but given to the press on March 11th. This order [“ President’sGeneral War Order No. 1”], dated the 27th of January, directed all the armiesof the republic to take the field on the same day, that is, on the 22d of Feb-ruary, in honor of Washington’s birthday! In the West, where the rivers