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MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

brought the Southern army nearer to Richmond , at the same time placing iton the Urbana route, thus making a landing there impossible for us, andpermitting Lee to anticipate McClellan on the Virginia peninsula. McClellanwould not give up his plan of approaching Richmond from the south-east.Fort Monroe, occupied by the Federals, was chosen as the new point ofdebarkation, and the pursuit of the enemy on the road from Manassas toFredericksburg had no other object than to deceive him as to the intentionsof the Federals. The army, after having feigned pursuit, was ordered toconcentrate near Alexandria, the rendezvous of the grand flotilla whichMcClellan awaited with so much impatience.

But on the 12th of March another unexpected event again caused conster-nation among the officers of the staff. The indefatigable newsdealers, whofollowed the army almost to the very line of battle, had brought papers fromWashington, in which we read a decree [“ President’s War Order No. 3 ”], datedMarch 11th, in effect relieving McClellan from the direction in chief of thearmies of the United States , the pretext being that McClellan had not takenthe field on the 22d of February [see p. 167]. It was recalled to mind that onthat very day, McClellan, on going upon the floor of the House of Representa-tives , had been greeted by a triple salvo of applause, a demonstration flatteringenough, but damaging to a general, whose functions forbid even the suspicionof political partisanship. The measure in question was inept, since it virtuallyrestricted McClellan within the Department of the Potomac, excluding WestVirginia , then assigned to Fremont. The measure was especially disastrousin suppressing all general direction of military operations, and disintegratingthe ensemble. It had been decided that Scott was too superannuated toattend to this general direction; it was not for the purpose of abolishing itentirely that command had been confided to younger and more energetichands. Unfortunately, at this moment Mr. Lincoln had the weakness tothink that he himself could effectively exercise the supreme control, assignedhim in form, it is true, by a figment of the national Constitution. Asfor McClellan, the President’s decision was mortifying in its method, Lincolnhaving delayed its promulgation till after the departure of his general, andhaving left it to be communicated to the latter by the daily papers. YetMcClellan would have consoled himself, had not this measure been fol-lowed by others still more harassing, and of a nature to completely crippleintelligent action. But he was relieved of an immense responsibility; he wasleft at the head of an army eager to follow his lead, eager for battle, and con-fident of victory under his orders. He alone seemed to preserve his sang-froidin the midst of officers of all grades who flocked to his headquarters at Fair-fax Court House as the news spread rapidly from camp-fire to camp-fire.Among these officers were stanch supporters, secret foes, those jealous of hisfame, would-be worshipers of the rising sun, and, last but not least, indis-creet and compromising friends. In this evil hour McClellan felt how sternlypatriotic duty demanded of him that he should hide the mortification he feltat this wound to his feelings as an officer and a man. He sought for con-solation only in the sympathy and confidence of his soldiers.