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The first and most pressing demand was the immediate safety of the capi-tal and the Government. This was secured by enforcing the most rigiddiscipline, by organizing permanent brigades under regular officers, and byplacing the troops in good defensive positions, far enough to the front toafford room for manoeuvring and to enable the brigades to support each other.
The contingency of the enemy’s crossing the Potomac above the city was fore-seen and promptly provided for. Had he attempted this “about three monthsafter the battle of Manassas, ” he would, upon reaching “the rear of Washing-ton,” have found it covered by respectable works, amply garrisoned, with asufficient disposable force to move upon his rear and force him to “ a decisiveengagement.”! It would have been the greatest possible good fortune for usif he had made this movement at the time in question, or even some weeksearlier. It was only for a very few days after the battle of Bull Pun that themovement was practicable, and every day added to its difficulty.
Two things were at once clear: first, that a large and thoroughly organizedarmy was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion ; second, thatWashington must be so strongly fortified as to set at rest any reasonableapprehensions of its being carried by a sudden attack, in order that the activearmy might be free to move with the maximum strength and on any line ofoperations without regard to the safety of the capital.
These two herculean tasks were entered upon without delay or hesitation.They were carried to a successful conclusion, without regard to that impatientand unceasing clamor — inevitable among a people unaccustomed to war —which finally forced the hand of the general charged with their execution.He regarded their completion as essential to the salvation of his country, anddetermined to accomplish them, even if sacrificed in the endeavor. Nor hashe, even at this distant day, and after much bitter experience, any regretthat he persisted in his determination. Washington was surrounded by aline of strong detached works, armed with garrison artillery, and secureagainst assault. Intermediate points were occupied by smaller works, batteryepaulements, infantry intrenchments, etc. The result was a line of defenseswhich could easily be held by a comparatively small garrison against anyassault, and could be reduced only by the slow operations of a regular siege,requiring much time and material, and affording full opportunity to bring allthe resources of the country to its relief. At no time during the war was theenemy able to undertake the siege of Washington, nor, if respectably garri-soned, could it ever have been in danger from an assault. The maximumgarrison necessary to hold the place against a siege from any and every quar-ter was 34,000 troops, with 40 field-guns; this included the requisite reserves.
With regard to the formation of the Army of the Potomac, it must sufficeto say that everything was to be created from the very foundation. Pawmen and officers were to be disciplined and instructed. The regular armywas too small to furnish more than a portion of the general officers, and avery small portion of the staff, so that the staff-departments and staff-officerswere to be fashioned mainly out of the intelligent and enthusiastic, but per-
JThe words quoted are General Beauregard’s. (See Vol. I., p. 221).— Editors.