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fringed with, a dense growth of heavy forest-trees, and bordered by lowmarshy lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Within the limitsabove mentioned the firm ground, above high-water mark, seldom approachesthe river on either bank, and in no place did the high ground come near thestream on both banks. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great varia-tions in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of brief durationsufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom-lands for many days, renderingthe river absolutely impassable without long and strong bridges. When wereached the river it was found that all the bridges, except that at Meehanics-ville, had been destroyed. The right bank, opposite New, Meehanicsville, andMeadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, affording the enemy command-ing positions for his batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing therebuilding of important bridges. We were thus obliged to select otherless exposed points for our crossings. Should McDowell effect the prom-ised junction, we could turn the head-waters of the Chickahominy, andattack Richmond from the north and north-west, still preserving our lineof supply from White House . But with the force actually available such anattempt would expose the army to the loss of its communications and todestruction in -detail; for we had an able and savage antagonist, prompt totake advantage of any error on our part. The country furnished no supplies,so that we could not afford a separation from our depots. All the informa-tion obtained showed that Richmond was intrenched, that the enemy occu-pied in force all the approaches from the east, that he intended to disputeevery step of our advance, and that his army was numerically superior.Early on the 24th of May I received a telegram from the President, inform-ing me that McDowell would certainly march on the 26th, suggesting that Ishould detach a force to the right to cut off the retreat of the Confederateforce in front of Fredericksburg, and desiring me to march cautiously andsafely. On the same day another dispatch came, informing me that, in con-sequence of Stonewall Jackson ’s advance down the Shenandoah, the move-ment of McDowell was suspended. Next day the President again telegraphedthat the movement against General Banks seemed so general and connectedas to show that the enemy could not intend a very desperate defense of Rich-mond ; that he thought the time was near when I “must either attackRichmond or give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington.”I replied that all my information agreed that the mass of the enemy was stillin the immediate vicinity of Richmond , ready to defend it, and that theobject of Jackson ’s movement was probably to prevent reenforcements being-sent to me. On the 26th General Stoneman, with my advanced guard, cutthe Virginia Central Railroad in three places. On the same day I learnedthat a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of HanoverCourt House, to our right and rear, threatening our communications, and inposition to reenforce Jackson or oppose McDowell, whose advance was theneight miles south of Fredericksburg. I ordered General F. J. Porter to movenext morning to dislodge them. He took with him his own old division,Warren’s provisional brigade and Emory’s cavalry brigade. His operations