2 03
After spending a day on General Magruder’s defensive line, lie returned to Richmond andrecommended the abandonment of the Peninsula, and that we should take up a defensive posi-tion nearer to Richmond” [II., 86],
The President has forgotten my recommendation, or misunderstood it at thetime. I represented to him that General McClellan ’s design was, almost cer-tainly, to demolish our batteries with his greatly superior artillery, and turnus by the river, either landing in our rear or moving directly to Richmond;so that our attempting to hold Yorktown could only delay the enemy two orthree weeks. Instead of that, I proposed that all our available forces shouldbe united near Richmond, Magruder’s troops to be among the last to arrive;the great army thus formed about Richmond not to be in a defensive position,as Mr. Davis supposes, but to fall with its whole force upon McClellan whenthe Federal army was expecting to besiege only the troops it had followedfrom Yorktown. If the Federal army should be defeated a hundred milesaway from its place of refuge, Fort Monroe, it could not escape destruction.This was undoubtedly our best hope [see maps, pp. 167 and 188].
In the conference that followed the President took no part. But the Secre-tary of War, G. W. Randolph, once a naval officer, opposed the abandonmentof the valuable property in the Norfolk Navy Yard; and General Lee opposedthe plan proposed, because it would expose Charleston and Savannah to cap-ture. I maintained that if those places should be captured, the defeat of theprincipal Federal army would enable us to recover them; and that, unlessthat army should be defeated, we should lose those sea-ports in spite of theirgarrisons. Mr. Davis says:
“ After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I decided to resist the enemy onthe Peninsula. . . . Though General J. E. Johnston did not agree with this decision, he
did not ask to be relieved. . . .” [II., 87].
Not being in command, I could not be relieved. My assignment wasincluded in the order to oppose McClellan at Yorktown; that order added tomy then command the departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. It is noteasy to reconcile this increase of my command by the President, with his verynumerous disparaging notices of me.
General Keyes, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, confirmedmy opinion in saying that “ Gloucester must have fallen upon our [McClel-lan ’s] getting possession of Yorktown, and the York River would then havebeen open.”
Mr. Davis expresses the opinion that “ General McClellan certainly mighthave sent a detachment from his army, which, after crossing York River,could have turned the position at Gloucester Point” [II., 90]. That wouldhave been needless; the driving us from Yorktown would have compelledus to abandon Gloucester Point. Then [Vol. II., p. 91] he says:
“ Whether General McClellan . . . would have made an early assaidt ... or have
waited to batter our earth-works in breach ... is questionable ” [II., 91].
We did not apprehend “battering in breach,” but believed that the heavysea-coast rifles to be mounted in the batteries, about completed, would