206

MANASSAS TO SEVEN PINES.

are: (1) That what deserves to be called fighting ceased at least two hoursbefore dark, yet the Confederates held the ground until the next morning,having slept on the field, and then resumed their march; (2) that they foughtonly to protect their trains, and accomplished the object; (3) that althoughthey marched but twelve miles the day after the affair, they saw no indica-tions of pursuit, unless the seeing a scouting party once can so be called; (4)that they inflicted a loss much greater than that they suffered; (5) and thatin the ten days following the fight they marched but thirty-seven miles. Theyleft four hundred wounded in Williamsburg , because they had no means oftransporting them. But they captured five cannon and destroyed thecarriages of five more, and took four hundred prisoners and several colors.

Mr. Davis says:

“ In the meantime, Franklin’s division had gone up the York River and landed a short dis-tance below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in thedirection of the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. [McClellan wrote that the divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent fromYorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, near West Point.— J. E. J.] Twobrigades of General G. W. Smith’s division, Hampton’s and Hood’s, were detached under thecommand of General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driv-ing him through the wood to the protection of his gun-boats in York River ” [II., 98].

The Federal force engaged was very much less than a division.

Mr. Davis says, lower down: “ The loss of the enemy [in the battle ofWilliamsburg] greatly exceeded our own, which was about 1200.” He meansexclusive of General Early’s loss. According to General McClellan ’s reporthis loss was 2228. General Hooker stated under oath that his was 17004But Kearny’s, Couch ’s, and two-thirds of Smith’s division, and Peck’s brigadewere engaged also; a loss of 528 is very small among so many. [

Mr. Davis says:

“ Soon after General Johnston took position on the north of the Chickahominy, accompaniedby General Lee, I rode out to his headquarters. ... A long conversation followed, which■was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until the nextmorning. As we rode back to Richmond , . . . General Lee confessed himself, as I was

unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the policy was to . . . improve

his [Johnston’s] position as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gun-boats,so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on land ” [II., 101].

I explained that I had fallen back that far to clear my left flank of thenavigable water, and so avoid having it turned; that as we were too weak toassume the offensive, and as the position I then held was an excellent one,I intended to await the Federal attack there. These explanations coveredthe whole ground, so that the President had no cause to complain, especiallyas he suggested nothing better. And he was satisfied then; for, three dayslater, he wrote to me by Colonel G. W. C. Lee: “ ... If the enemyproceed as heretofore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it in

4 . The total Union loss was 2283, and Hooker’s ments of Kearny’s division (2 of Birney’s brigadeloss, 1575. See tables, p. 200.— Editors. and 3 of Berry’s) and 6 of Smith’s division (4 of

]) Peek’s brigade (five regiments) belonged to Hancock’s and 2 of Davidson’s) were engaged,Couch ’s division and was the only brigade of that so the loss (exclusive of Hooker’s) of 528 belonged,division which took part in the battle. Five regi- in fact, to only 16 regiments.— Editors.