TWO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SEVEN PINES.

22 3

The next day news was received of the attack on Drewry’s Bluff [see p. 271],and of the confusion and fright in Richmond . In this state of affairs, Gen-eral Johnston decided that it was expedient to cross the Chickahominy andtake position nearer the city, rather than continue to wait, north of that stream,for the advance of McClellan from the Pamunkey. Accordingly, orders wereissued that night for Longstreet’s “ corps ” to cross the Chickahominy at LongBridge, and for my command to cross at Bottom’s Bridge. A regiment ofriflemen was sent direct to aid in the defense of Drewry’s Bluff. On the 17th,Longstreet’s division was about five miles from Richmond , in the direction ofthe James River defenses ; D. H. Hill’s division, on Longstreet’s left, guardedthe Charles City road, and was about three miles from Richmond ; G. W.Smith’s division was on the Williamsburg road, and north of it, two or threemiles from the city, with one brigade in observation at Bottom’s Bridge;whilst Magruder’s troops extended from Old Tavern, on the Nine-mile road,to New Bridge, thence along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs to theMechanicsville road.

McClellan’s army approached the Chickahominy slowly. On the 23d Keyes’scorps crossed at Bottom’s Bridge; on the 25tli he reached the position knownlater as the “ third line of defense,” at which point, as well as at Bottom’s Bridge,strong earth-works were constructed; on the 27th the leading division ofKeyes’s corps occupied and commenced to fortify a position across the Will-iamsburg road at Seven Pines. In the meantime Heintzelman’s corps hadcrossed at Bottom’s Bridge; one division remained near that place, and theother division was posted at White Oak Bridge. Three corps of McClellan’sarmy were still on the north side of the Chickahominy, their left near the rail-road, their right, thrown back in a naturally strong position, on the left bankof Beaver Dam Creek, with an intrenched outpost at Mechanicsville. All thebridges and fords along the Chickahominy in their front were in possession ofthe Pederals; and they were rapidly constructing new bridges.

In the meantime there had been no material change in the position of theConfederate forces. General Johnston was closely watching the movements ofthe Pederals approaching on the Williamsburg road; but, in his opinion, theproper time to strike McClellan’s left wing had not come. On the morning ofthe 27th our pickets were closely pressed just east of Old Tavern. This wassome indication that the enemy were probably coming nearer in large force,and would soon be within our effective reach, on the Williamsburg or Nine-mile road, or on both. Our attention was, however, almost immediatelydiverted to McClellan’s right flank, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy.

At 1 p. m. that day I received a note from General Johnston, stating he hadjust been informed that McDowell was advancing from Fredericksburg inforce. This put a new phase on Confederate affairs around Richmond . Itwas well understood by us that McDowell had an army of about 40,000men; | McClellan’s forces were known to be about 100,000, and we could notafford to wait until McDowell reached him.

4- About 35,000 effectives. McDowell asked for subsistence for 38,000 men, including, of course,

the non-effectives.— Editors.