228

TWO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SEVEN PINES.

that it would soon be filled by Sumner’s corps. In his “ Fifty Years’ Obser-vations,” General Keyes says:

“ The left of my lines was all protected by the White Oak Swamp, but the right was onground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that ifJohnston had attacked there an hour or two earlier than lie did, I could have made but a feebledefense comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven intothe swamp or river before assistance could have reached us.”

Isolated as Keyes’s corps was, every effort should have been made tostrongly fortify the ground it occupied. The defenses in front were weak andincomplete. The vulnerable and easily accessible right flank—the point atwhich attack ought to have been expected, because Confederate success at thatplace would have cut the Federal army in two, and would have exposed itsleft wing to destruction—ought to have been strongly fortified instead ofbeing left entirely open. All this would have been practically illustrated ifGeneral Johnston’s intentions had been carried into effect—that is, if Long-street’s division in full force had struck Keyes’s right flank near Fair Oaks,when D. H. Hill’s division moved against Keyes’s front. But, through a“ misunderstanding,” General Longstreet transferred his own division to theWilliamsburg road, instead of moving to the attack by the Nine-mile road,and he caused that division to take precedence of Huger’s division at thecrossing of Gilliss Creek, which at daylight was a raging torrent. GeneralHuger, in a report, says: “ Longstreet’s division got the road at the crossingfirst ”; and adds that his own troops “ had to wait until they [Longstreet’sdivision] had passed. The delay after that was the time necessary to cross.” ☆

Captain B. Sloan, of Huger’s staff, says in a letter dated August 17th, 1885:

“ Longstreet’s brigades as they successively reached the plain above the creek halted andremained for an hour or two resting on their arms. This plain (in front of General Huger’sheadquarters) was perhaps between three and four miles in rear of the battle-field. Here, at afarm-house, Huger met Longstreet and Hill, and a discussion was had as to the movements ofthe divisions, and as to the relative rank of the division commanders. Longstreet claimed (byinstructions from General Johnston) to be in command of that portion of the army. After pro-test Huger acquiesced.”

It was “ then possibly 10 a. m. or 11 A. m.” After that time “Huger’smovements were directed by Longstreet.”

Governor William E. Cameron, who was then adjutant of the 12th Virginia ,

On the 20th of September, 1862, GeneralHuger wrote to General Johnston:

* ‘ I beg to refer you to my letter of the 20 th ultimo. Ihave waited one month, and no reply has been receivedfrom General Longstreet. As you have indorsed hiserroneous statements, to my injury, I must hold you re-sponsible, and desire to know from you if you have anyreason to believe an answer will be made by GeneralLongstreet. You must perceive that by postponing ananswer your published report is allowed to go down tohistory as true. 1 cannot conceive that you desire to per-petrate such an injustice, for, though it may ruin me, itcannot redound to your credit. ... I send you here-with an abstract of such parts of your report as refer tomy division, with my remarks annexed, to which I inviteyour attention.”

In Huger’s abstract of Johnston’s report we find :

“Major-General Longstreet, uuwilling to make a par-tial attack, . . . waited from hour to hour for GeneralHuger’s division. . . . Had Major-General Huger’sdivision been in position and ready for action whenthose of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satis-fied that Keyes’s corps would have been destroyedinstead of merely defeated. . . . Had it gone intoaction at 4 o’clock, the victory would have been muchmore complete.”

In his remarks on these abstracts, Huger says:

“ When General Longstreet’s troops moved to supportGeneral Hill’s attack, General Huger’s division moveddown the Charles City road at the same time with threebrigades of Longstreet’s division . . . to the last para-graph I have only to say that if it [Huger’s division] didnot go into action by 4 o’clock, it was because GeneralLongstreet did not require it, as it was in position andawaiting his orders.” G. W. S.