TPVO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SEVEN PINES.

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opposed to D. H. Hill. Immediately after being thus cut off, General Couch communicated with Bin icy’s brigade on the railroad, a mile or more east ofFair Oaks, and endeavored to make arrangements by which the cut-off forcescould rejoin Keyes. Just then it was reported to General Couch that a largeConfederate force on the Mne-mile road was rapidly advancing on Fair Oaks,and the four regiments and battery retreated in the direction of Sumner’sbridges. On reaching a point aboutone thousand yards north of Fair Oaks,

General Couch was informed that theleading troops of Sumner’s corps wereclosely approaching. Couch haltedhis forces, formed line of battle, facingnearly south, placed two guns on eachside of the road, and prepared todefend the position until Sumner’stroops could come up.

It is now proposed to give in somedetail an account of the movementsthat day of my division under Whitingwhich prevented Sumner’s forces from reaching Keyes at Seven Pines, andincidentally deprived Keyes and Heintzelman of the services of two brigadesand a battery of their own troops.

In my official report (as originally submitted to General Johnston), it isstated that

“ on arriving at the headquarters of General Johnston about sunrise [May 31st], I learnedfrom him that his intention was that General Longstreet’s division should move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg road, and General Huger’s by theCharles City road. The enemy, it was understood, had already upon this side of the Chicka-hominy a force variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000 men. The recent rains hadmaterially increased the difficulty of crossing that stream, and, notwithstanding the very badcondition of the roads over which we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy condition of thefields and woods through which our troops would have to operate, it was believed that anenergetic attack early in the morning, properly supported and followed up, would result indefeat to that portion of the enemy already upon this side before the other portion of theirarmy could cross the swollen river — either to reenforce their troops or to attack the city in ourrear. . . . General Johnston’s intentions, as then explained to me, were, that whilst General

D. H. Hill’s division was attacking the enemy’s advanced position on the Williamsburg stageroad in front, . . . General Longstreet’s division would engage the enemy on Hill’s left.”

About 6 a. m. the head of the division under Whiting reached the vicinityof General Johnston’s headquarters. There its way, to a point on theNine-mile road near the suburb, was blocked by troops of Longstreet’sdivision. General Whiting wrote to General Johnston asking that the routeshould be cleared. In reply, a staff-officer wrote: “ General Johnston directsme to say, in answer to yours of this date, that Longstreet will precede you.”This quieted Whiting for a time, but, as the delay continued, he becameimpatient, and having heard that I was at General Johnston’s headquarters,he came there to see if I could not have his line of march cleared of Long-street’s troops. About 8 a. m. I sent my aide-de-camp, Captain Beckham, to

LINE OF BATTLE OF GENERAL DEVENS’S BRIGADE, BE-TWEEN THE WILLIAMSBURG AND NINE-MILEROADS — GENERAL DEVENS WOUNDED.

FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.