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TWO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SFWEN PINES.

established that General Johnston intended Longstreet’s division shouldmove into action on the Nine-mile road, and support Hill by attackingKeyes’s right flank. It is noticeable that General Johnston, in his officialreport, makes no mention of the information he received in regard to thetransfer of Longstreet’s division to the Williamsburg road, or of the attemptmade to have at least three brigades sent back to the Nine-mile road. Noallusion is made, in either of their official reports, to the note from Longstreet,received by Johnston about 4 p. m.

The anxiety felt by those near Old Tavern was extreme in the hours of sus-pense previous to 4 p. m., during which all were expecting to hear that thefighting on the Williamsburg road had commenced. In my official report itis stated that “ as the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard fromGeneral Longstreet’s attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for sometwo or three hours, but little musketry, it seemed that no real attack waslikely to be made that day.” Previous to 4 p. m. it was believed by all on theNine-mile road that no attack had yet been made; the division on that roadcould not be advanced beyond McLaws ’s picket-line without bringing on thebattle which General Johnston intended should be initiated by the divisions ofHill and Longstreet. The division under Whiting was there for the purposeof holding in check reenforcements from the north side of the river thatwould surely be sent to Keyes as soon as he was attacked in force; andWhiting was oidy to reenforce Longstreet “ should there be cause of haste.”The information finally received not only warned General Johnston that thebattle had been raging for several hours, but the character of Longstreet’snote conveyed the distinct impression that the delay from 8 a. m. to theafternoon had enabled the Federals to reenforce Keyes to such an extent thatLongstreet had met with more opposition than the whole of his commandcould well overcome. In this state of affairs General Johnston ordered thedivision under Whiting to move forward as rapidly as possible, and himselfurged and led the division against “ the right flank of Longstreet’s adver-saries ” without further regard to reenforcements from the north side of theChickahominy. This advance was so rapid that no artillery was carried for-ward, on account of the almost impracticable condition of the ground. Verysoon after this movement commenced, General Johnston directed Hood’sbrigade to bear strongly to the right, and go direct to the assistance ofLongstreet, who was supposed to be in front of the enemy, near Seven Pines.But it has already been seen that Colonel Jenkins’s command had then burstacross the Nine-mile road a little south of Pair Oaks, and was “scouring”the rear of that road; and that 8 of the 13 brigades under Longstreet’s controlhad not been put in action. Nothing of this, however, was then known toGeneral Johnston. When the head of the column on the Nine-mile road, inthe hurried movement to aid Longstreet, reached the vicinity of Pair OaksStation, General Johnston censured General Whiting for hesitating to crossthe railroad before disposing of a Federal force, north of that station, inposition to threaten the left flank and rear of Whiting’s command in case hemoved farther. I was not present, but the following extracts from a letter to