TWO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SENEN PINES.

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Soon after daylight there was sharp firing for a few minutes betweenHood’s skirmishers, near the railroad, and the extreme right of Richardson’sposition. These skirmishers were promptly recalled, and Whiting was orderedto make no advance until the attack by the right wing was well developed, infull force. In this affair Hood lost thirteen wounded. No part of the divis-ion under Whiting was again engaged during the day; because, althoughthere was a good deal of heavy firing in the right wing that morning, nothingwas observed from the Nine-mile road that indicated to me a real and deter-mined attack, in full force by the right wing, such as I intended Whitingshould support.

At 6:30 a. m. firing in the wood commenced, a little south of the railroad,about half a mile or more east of Fair Oaks, and was sufficiently heavy toindicate that the movement Longstreet had been ordered to make had begun.This heavy firing continued for an hour or more, nearly at the same place,but did not develop into an attack in full force. It lulled for a while, and waspresently renewed, but now at a point several hundred yards south of therailroad. Longstreet’s troops were evidently losing ground without his hav-ing made an attack with more than a very small portion of the Right Wing.

In the meantime my chief of staff, who was on the Chickahominy bluffs,had, from time to time, reported movements of troops, pontoons, etc., on thenorth side of the river, showing preparations for sending over additionalFederal reenforcements. The first information received from General Long-street was contained in a note from him, dated 8 a. m., saying: “ I haveordered a brigade of General Huger’s, as agreed upon. Please send a guidefor it.” About 10:30 a. m. the following was received from General Long-street : “ The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a brigade is

in action.” In a few minutes this came from him: “ The entire army

seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made inmy favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it.The ammunition gives out too readily.” And directly after, a note, dated10 a. m., was received, saying: “ Can you reenforce me ? The entire armyseems to be opposed to me. ... If I can’t get help, I fear I must fallback.”

His leading troops had fallen back some time before; this was evidentfrom observations made on the Nine-mile road. In Longstreet’s dire extrem-ity, as shown in the three notes received almost at one time, there weretwo ways in which I could then, possibly, help him,— one was by order-ing Whiting forward over the open ground, and in deep mud, against thestrong lines and numerous batteries of Sedgwick and Richardson; the otherwas to strip the Chickahominy of its defenders above New Bridge, and sendreenforcements direct to Longstreet on the Williamsburg road. I adoptedthe latter course, and requested General McLaws to go to General Long-street, inform him that about five thousand men had been ordered to reen-force him, assure him that the whole Federal army was not in his front, tellhim that he must not fall back any farther, but drive the enemy, and, if pos-sible, regain the ground he had lost.