WEST VIRGINIA OPERATIONS UNDER FREMONTJ
HE campaign of the spring of 1862 was an interesting one in its details,
h but as it became subordinate to that against Jackson in the Shenandoahand was never completed as Fremont had planned, a very brief sketch ofit must suffice. On the 29th of March Fremont assumed command of the“Mountain Department,” including West Virginia, eastern Kentucky , andEast Tennessee as far as Knoxville . There was a little too much sentimentand too little practical war in the construction of a department out of fivehundred miles of mountain ranges, and the appointment of the “ path-finder ”to command it was consistent with the romantic character of the whole. Themountains formed an admirable barrier at which comparatively small bodiesof troops could cover and protect the Ohio Valley behind them, but extensivemilitary operations across and beyond the Alleghanies from west or eastwere impracticable, because a wilderness a hundred miles wide, crossed byfew and most difficult roads, rendered it impossible to supply troops fromdepots on either side. The country was so wild that not even forage for mulescould be found in it, and the teams could hardly haul their own provenderfor the double trip. Quick “ raids ” were therefore all that ever proved feasible.
Fremont had formed a plan of campaign which consisted in starting withBlenker’s division (which had been taken from the Army of the Potomac andgiven to him) from Romney in the valley of the south branch of the Poto-mac, ascending this valley toward the south, picking up Schenck’s and Mil-roy’s brigades in turn, the latter joining the column at Monterey , on thegreat watershed, by way of the Cheat Mountain Pass. From Monterey Fre-mont intended to move upon Staunton and thence, following the south-western trend of the valleys, to the New River near Christiansburg. Here hewould come into communication with me, whose task it would have been toadvance from Gauley Bridge on two lines, the principal one by Fayette andRaleigh Court House over Flat-top Mountain to Princeton and the Narrowsof New River, and a subordinate one on the turnpike to Lewisburg. Theplan looked to continuing the march to the south-west with the whole columntill Knoxville should be reached, the last additions to the force to be from thetroops in the Big Sandy Valley of eastern Kentucky .
The plan would probably have failed, first, from the impossibility of supply-ing the army on the route, as it would have been without any reliable or safebase; and second, because the railroads east of the mountains ran on routesspecially well adapted to enable the enemy quickly to concentrate any neededforce at Staunton, at Lynchburg , at Christiansburg, or at Wytheville to over-power the column. The Union army would be committed to a whole sea-son of marching in the mountains, while the Confederates could concentratethe needed force and quickly return it to Richmond when its work was done,making but a brief episode in a larger campaign. But the plan was not
J A continuation of: “ McClellan in West Virginia.” See Vol. I., p. 126.— Editors.
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