285
Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fightingqualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy’s troops from the Yalley.
The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General John-ston that it was decided to reenforce Jackson by sending General Ewell’sdivision to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May,thus giving Jackson an aggregate force of from 13,000 to 15,000 men to openhis campaign with. At the beginning of May the situation was broadly aboutas follows: Milroy, with about 4087 men, was on the Staunton and Parkers-burg road at McDowell, less than forty miles from Staunton, with Schenck’sbrigade of about 2500 near Franklin. The rest of Fremont’s army in themountain department was then about 30,000 men, of whom 20,000 were con-centrating at Franklin, fifty miles north-west of Staunton, and within sup-porting distance of Milroy. Banks , who had fortified Strasburg, seventymiles north-east of Staunton by the great Yalley turnpike, to fall back uponin an emergency, had pushed forward a force of 20,000 men to Harrisonburg ,including Shields’s division, 10,000 strong. General McDowell, with 34,000men, exclusive of Shields’s division, was at points east of the Blue Ridge , soas to be able to move either to Fredericksburg or to the Luray Yalley andthence to Staunton. Not counting Colonel Miles’s, later Saxton’s, command,at Harper’s Ferry , which was rapidly increased to 7000 men, sent from Wash-ington and other points north of the Potomac, before the end of May, Jack-son had about 80,000 men to take into account (including all Union forcesnorth of the Rappahannock and east of the Ohio ) and to keep from a junc-tion with McClellan in front of Richmond. Not less than 65,0001 of theseenemies were in the Valley under their various commanders in May andJune [see p. 299].
Besides Ewell’s division already mentioned, General Johnston could give nofurther assistance to Jackson , for McClellan was right in his front withsuperior numbers, and menacing the capital of the Confederacy with almostimmediate and certain capture. Its only salvation depended upon Jackson ’sability to hold back Fremont, Banks , and McDowell long enough to letJohnston try doubtful conclusions with McClellan. If he failed in this, thesethree commanders of an aggregate force then reputed to be, and I believe infact, over one hundred thousand j) would converge and move down uponRichmond from the west as McClellan advanced from the east, and the cityand its defenders would fall an easy prey to nearly, if not quite, a quarter ofa million of the best-armed and best-equipped men ever put into the field byany government.
Early in May, Jackson was near Port Republic contemplating his surround-ings and maturing his plans. What these latter were 110 one but himself knew.
Suddenly the appalling news spread through the Valley that he had fled to
4 . This seems to us an overestimate of the Union 10,203), aggregated about 21,000. Total, 44,840.forces actually in the Valley during the operations Saxton had about 7000 at Harper’s Ferry , whichof May and June. April 30th, Banks had 9178 were not engaged.— Editors.
“ present for duty ”; May 31st, Fremont had
14,672 (Cox and Kelley not in the Valley); Me- ]> We estimate that there were not above 80,000Dowell’s force that reached the Valley (including Union troops in the three departments that couldShield’s division, which on May 31st numbered have been moved toward Richmond.— Editors.