HANOVER COURT HOUSE AND GAINES’S MILL.

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veteran soldier — examples inspiring emulation in these trying “ seven days’battles.”

Part of the general details previously adopted was then ordered to befollowed, and subsequently was enforced as near as practicable in all thebattles in which my corps engaged: that under no circumstances should themen expose themselves by leaving them intrenchments, or other cover, merelyto pursue a repulsed foe; nor, except in uneven ground which would permitthe fire of artillery to pass well over their heads, was infantry or cavalry tobe posted in front of a battery, or moved so as to interfere with its fire.Bullet, shot, and shell were to be relied upon for both repulse and pursuit.

Sitting for hours near the telegraph operator at my quarters, prior to theattack, I listened to the constant and rapid “ ticking ” of his instrument, andwas kept informed, by the various intercommunicating messages at the head-quarters of the army, of the condition of affairs in front of the three corpsfarthest to the left. Reports often came from them that the enemy’s campsseemed to be largely deserted, confirming the information that the enemy hadgathered in front of Franklin and myself. Yet, the following day, when Icalled for aid to resist the forces of Lee and Jackson at Gaines’s Mill, knownto be immensely superior to mine, the commanders of these three corpsexpressed the belief that they were about to be attacked by bodies largerthan their own, and objected to detaching any part of their troops. [Seefoot-note, p. 180.]

From the cavalry scouts of Colonel John F. Farnsworth, Stoneman, andGeneral P. St. George Cooke, whose forces stretched, in the order named, fromMeadow Bridge north to the Pamunkey, reports came that Jackson wasadvancing slowly upon my flank. I was also informed that the departureof Jackson from Northern Virginia was suspected, but not positively known,at Washington; but that at this critical moment no assistance whatever couldbe expected from that vicinity.

Perhaps at this time the Administration had been crippled by its own acts,and could not respond to General McClellan ’s calls for aid. About April 1st,when our army began active operations in the field and recruiting should havebeen encouraged, the enrollment of troops was ordered to be stopped. TheWar Governor of Pennsylvania [Andrew G. Curtin ] notably disregardedthis order. His foresight was afterward recognized at Autietam, where hewas able to render valuable assistance. In the month of June, however, thepolicy had begun to change, and the troops in Northern Virginia were beingplaced in charge of an officer [General John Pope ] called to Washington “totake command of Banks and Fremont, perhaps McDowell, take the fieldagainst Jackson, and eventually supersede McClellan .” At the day the order

& The outposts at Meadow Bridge, the extreme Hundley’s Corner, at the crossing of Totopotornoywestern front of Porter’s line, were attacked by Creek. The cavalry under General Cooke and Col-Confederates advancing from Richmond under A. onel Farnsworth moved with the main army, andP. Hill, about noon on the 26th. and during the the force under Stoneman, consisting of cavalryafternoon the columns under Jackson encountered and infantry, retired down the Pamunkey to Whitethe cavalry pickets on the Hanover Court House House Landing, and joined the force there underroad, six miles north of Mechanicsville, and at General Casey.— Editors.von. 11. 22