HANOVER COURT HOUSE AND GAINES’S MILL.

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coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on theleft. Stoneman’s detachment of cavalry and infantry, miles to the north, wasno longer available. Fearing it might he cut off by Jackson, I sent Stonemanword to make his way as best he could to White House , and in proper time torejoin the army—wherever it might be.

Believing my forces too small to defend successfully this long line, I askedGeneral Barnard, when he left me, to represent to General McClellan the neces-sity of reenforcements to thicken and to fill vacant spaces in my front line.He himself promised me axes. This was my first request for aid, but nonecame in response. The axes did not arrive till near dark, and were use-less ; but with the few obtained early in the day from the artillery, and inthe little time at command, trees were felled along a small portion of ourfront, and barriers were erected, which were filled in with rails and knapsacks.

While withdrawing from Beaver Dam, I had seen, to my delight, GeneralH. W. Slocum’s division of Franklin’s corps crossing the river to my assistance.McClellan had promised to send it, and I needed it; it was one of the bestdivisions of the army. Its able, experienced, and gallant commander and hisbrave and gifted subordinates had the confidence of their well-trained soldiers.They were all worthy comrades of my well-tried and fully trusted officers,and of many others on that field, subsequently honored by their countrymen.But to our disappointment, through some misunderstanding, the divisionwas almost immediately recalled to Franklin. In response, however, to a latercall, it returned at a time when it was greatly needed, and rendered invalu-able services.

I fixed my headquarters at first at the Adams house; but early in the bat-tle that locality became a hospital, and I advanced to the Watts house, onmore elevated ground, whence I could see the greater part of the field andcommunicate readily with all parts of it.

Thus far, it will be seen, all plans were defensive ; I had reason to believethat the enemy largely outnumbered me—three to one. Evidently it wastheir plan and their policy to crush me, if possible. Their boldness and

little while the state of the firing convinced him thatPorter ‘ didn’t drive worth a cent,’ and he bestirred him-self to let out his full strength. Then it was that, afterordering Ewell’s advance, he wheeled on me and beganto give instructions about putting in his six other bri-gades, which were then standing idle in the road bywhich we had come. I sent them in from left to right enechelon , each brigade to support its left-hand neighbor,and to move to the sound of the firing. The strangestdivergencies, however, took place in consequence of thecoppices and woods and lack of guides. Law and Hoodkept the proper relation to Ewell’s right, and thushelped A. P. Hill ’s beaten division, attacked the enemy’scenter or left center, and about 6 p. m. drove it in. ButLawton, bearing too much by his own left, unwittinglycrossed Hood’s line of march and reenforced Ewell — amost timely providence, for Ewell’s line was about donefor. The 2d Virginia brigade seems to have borneas much too far to the right, and at last, near sunset,found themselves behind Longstreet’s extreme right,—the brigade of E. H. Anderson, whom they assisted indriving the enemy. The 3d Virginia brigade broughtup behind Lougstreet’s left, passing near Gaines’s Mill,and near sunset participated in the victory. The Stone-wall brigade, under Winder, bore too much to the left

and entered the fight on your right. Pickett’s brigade,headed by the ‘Old Ironsides’ ( 18 tli Virginia ), brokePorter’s line just west of the Watts house.” With regardto this break, General Law, in a letter to the Editors,says: “ Whiting’s division covered the ground on whichJ. R. Anderson’s, Archer’s, and Field’s brigades had pre-viously attacked. We passed over some of these men aswe advanced to the assault. \Xe carried the Federalline in our front, and Longstreet on our right, bringingup his reserves, again attacked and carried his front.”At the last and successful advance the line from left toright was: Longstreet (Anderson, Pickett), Whiting(Hood and Law), Jackson (Winder and Lawton), Ewell(one or two brigades), and D. H. Hill (Kodes, Anderson,and Garland). General Porter thinks the first break inhis line was made by Hood from the direction indicatedon the map by an arrow. Of the Union reserves, McCall’sdivision was put in on the line of Morell,—except apart of Reynolds’s brigade, which went to the assistanceof Warren; Slocum’s division also went to the left,—ex-cept Bartlett’s brigade, which was sent to the right ofSykes around the McGeliee house.

Note. — The map is incorrect in one regard: Long-street’s right did not extend so far south as Morell’s left.

Editors.