LEE’S ATTACKS NORTH OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.

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eral Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill , will cross the Chickahominy ator near that point — General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General ILongstreet supporting General A. P. Hill — the four divisions keeping in communication with :each other, and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable ; the left division in advance,with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy,and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jacksonbearing well to his left, turning Beaver Bam Creek, and taking the direction toward ColdHarbor, etc.”

General Jackson was unable to reach the point expected on the morning ofthe 26tli. General A. P. Hill says: “Three o’clock p. m. having arrived, andno intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once, ratherthan hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it.”

Heavy firing was heard at 3 p. m. at Meadow Bridge, and the Federal out-posts were seen fleeing toward Mechanicsville, pursued by A. P. Hill . Wecould see a line of battle drawn up at that village ready to receive Hill . Mydivision being nearest the bridge, Longstreet ordered me to cross first. Somedelay was made in repairing the bridge, and A. P. Hill became hotly engaged jbefore we could get to his relief. At this time President Davis and staff hur-ried past us, going “ to the sound of the firing.” Ripley’s brigade was pushedforward to the support of three batteries of artillery of Major H. P. Jones’sbattalion, and the two under Captains R. A. Hardaway and J. W. Bondurant.The five batteries soon silenced the Federal artillery, and the whole plateauabout Meehanicsville was abandoned to the Confederates, the Federals retiringacross Beaver Dam Creek, which was strongly fortified. Our engineers seemto have had little knowledge of the country, and none of the fortifications onthe creek. The maps furnished the division commanders were worthless. Ata request from General W. D. Pender, who had been roughly handled inattacking works on the creek, Brigadier-General Ripley, of my division, wasdirected to cooperate with him, and the attack was made about dark. Theenemy had intrenchments of great strength and development on the other sideof the creek, and had lined the banks with his magnificent artillery. Theapproach was over an open plain exposed to a murderous fire of all arms, andacross an almost impassable stream. The result was, as might have been fore-seen, a bloody and disastrous repulse. Nearly every field-officer in the brigadewas killed or wounded. It was unfortunate for the Confederates that thecrossing was begun before Jackson got in rear of Meehanicsville. The loss ofthat position would have necessitated the abandonment of the line of BeaverDam Creek, as in fact it did, the next day. We were lavish of blood in thosedays, and it was thought to be a great thing to charge a battery of artillery oran earth-work lined with infantry. “ It is magnificent, but it is not war,” wasthe sarcastic remark of the French general as he looked on at the Britishcavalry charge at Balaklava. The attacks on the Beaver Dam intrench-ments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at Gettysburg , etc., were all grand,but of exactly the kind of grandeur which the South could not afford.

A brisk cannonade was kept up on the morning of the 27th for an hour ormore from the Federal artillery along the line of Beaver Dam, which washeld by a thin line of skirmishers, the main force having retreated to Gaines’s