LEE’S ATTACKS NORTH OF THE CHICKAHOMINY. 361

the Chiekahominy, and when he awoke, his troops were gone and the bridgewas broken down.

Winder, Anderson, and Garland, probably the most promising of all ouryoung brigadiers, fell fighting for the cause they loved. Reynolds, one of thenoblest of mankind, fell doing his duty on his side at Gettysburg . Sykes, asthe friend of McClellan, never received the recognition which his knightlyqualities demanded. Worst of all, Porter, who commanded on the field themost creditable to the Federal arms, received that condemnation so muchworse than death from the country he had served ably and loyally.

In these battles, the great want with the Confederates, strange as it mayseem, was accurate knowledge of the country in their front. The map fur-nished me (and I suppose the six other major-generals had no better) wasvery full in regard to everything within our own lines; but a red line on theeast side of the Chiekahominy and nearly parallel to it, without any pointsmarked on it, was our only guide to the route on which our march was to bemade.) None of us knew of the formidable character of the works on BeaverDam. The blood shed by the Southern troops there was wasted in vain, andworse than in vain; for the fight had a most dispiriting effect on our troops.They could have been halted at Mechanicsville until Jackson had turned theworks on the creek, and all that waste of blood could have been avoided.Ripley’s brigade was sent to the assistance of Pender, by the direct order,through me, of both Mr. Davis and General Lee. They both felt pressingupon them the vast importance of keeping near Richmond , and of openingup communications with it as soon as possible. The crossing of the river byGeneral A. P. Hill before hearing from Jackson precipitated the fight on thefirst day; and it having begun, it was deemed necessary to keep it up, withoutwaiting for Jackson. The same necessity compelled Lee on the second dayto attack his antagonist on his own strong and well-chosen position. Lee knewthat McClellan depended upon the York River Railroad for his supplies, andby moving upon that road he could have compelled the battle upon his ownselected ground, with all the advantages thereof. The lack of transportation,and the fear of the capture of Richmond while he was making this detour tothe Federal rear, constrained him to surrender the advantage of positionwisely chosen by the Federals and skillfully arranged for defense.

During Lee’s absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan; but

i General E. M. Law, writing on this point inthe u Southern Bivouac,” says :

“ The real trouble was that the Confederate officers,even those in high command, knew little or nothing ^)fthe topography of the country in which they wereoperating. An accurate map in the hands of each divis-ion commander would have saved many valuable livesat Gaines’s mill as well as at Ellerson’s, and timeenough would have been gained to have brought thewhole Confederate force upon the field at the formerplace several hours before it actually reached there. IfPorter’s lines had been broken at 4 o’clock instead ofat half-past 6, he would not have had the cover of nightto withdraw his routed troops, and his whole commandcould have been captured or destroyed in attemptingthe passage of the Chiekahominy. There was no reason

why this was not done, except the one given. The Fed-erals, on the other hand, knew the country thoroughly;they had occupied it for several weeks, and during thattime their engineer officers had inspected it carefully.. . . There was no earthly reason why the Confederateauthorities should not have been possessed of the sameinformation. The Federal Government had been all theprevious winter preparing for the advance upon Kich-mond. McClellan was a long time getting from York-town to his position on the Chiekahominy, and all hismovements indicated the probable position he would takeup in front of Richmond . There was no lack of time, there-fore, to map the locality accurately, and no lack of warn-ing that it would be of the most vital importance. Toundertake the defense of a city, without attempting tolearn the topography of the country around it, was a newprinciple in modern warfare.” Editors.

VOL. II. 24