3 6 4

ON THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT AT GAINES’S MILL.

in reserve, passed through on the right, and ledthe way for Longstreet’s division, while on the leftthe roll of musketry receded toward the Chicka-hominy, and the cheering of the victorious Con-federates announced that Jackson, Ewell, and D.H. Hill were sweeping that part of the field.

The battle was won; the Federal infantry wasin full flight toward the swamps of the Chickahom-iny and the bridges in their rear, leaving a largeportion of their artillery in the hands of the Con-federates. But the fighting was not all over.Several Federal batteries, posted in reserve on thefurther side of the plateau which the Confederateshad gained, opened a rapid but rather ineffectivefire, with the view of covering the retreat of theirinfantry. The 4th Texas and 18th Georgia regi-ments of Hood’s, and the 11th Mississippi and4th Alabama of Law’s brigade, continued theiradvance across the plateau directly upon thesebatteries. And here occurred an incident of thebattle which has been a subject of much acrimo-nious dispute among Federal officers, especiallyGenerals Porter and Philip St. George Cooke , thelatter commanding the cavalry on Porter ’s extremeleft next to the Chickahominy. In order to protectthe guns upon which Law and Hood were advanc-ing, General Cooke withdrew a portion of hiscommand from the low grounds near the riverand ordered a charge by a battalion of the 5thUnited States Cavalry upon the advancing Confed-erates. Our line was ragged and irregular, asevery soldier knows will be the case after suchfighting as it had passed through, and the opportu-nity seemed favorable to cheek its farther advanceand save the batteries from capture. The chargewas directed upon the center of the Confederateline, which was halted and partly re-formed toreceive it. Though delivered in most gallant style,it was repulsed with heavy loss, including all butone of the officers who entered it. This episodeconsumed scarcely more time than it takes to writeit. In the meantime, those of the cavalry whoescaped retreated through the artillery they wereattempting to save, and in the confusion of theretreat most of the guns were captured.

General Porter represents this charge as havingbeen made on his extreme left (Longstreet’s right),and beyond the stream along which his infantryline was originally formed, and severely censuresGeneral Cooke , charging him with throwing theartillery into confusion by retreating through it

N These troops were the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves,of McCall’s division, and the 4th New Jersey , Slocum’sdivision. The 11th lost 50 killed, and 634, includingwounded, were made prisoners.

Colonel J. H. Simpson, of the 4th New Jersey , ex-plains the circumstances of the capture in a letterwritten from the military prison, Richmond, Va. , July8th, 1862, in which he says:

’ ‘ To relieve my friends of all apprehension about my safety,I write to say that I am now here a prisoner of war, with alarge portion of my regiment, and in good health and spirits.My regiment was posted in the wood to sustain the center inthe battle near Gaines’s Mill, on Friday, .Tune 27tli, and noblydid it hold its ground till about an hour after the right andleft wings of the army had fallen back. Mine (4th NewJersey ) and Colonel Gallagher’s lltli Pennsylvania Reserve

and preventing it from checking the Confederateadvance. His statement as to the locality of thecavalry attack and his charges against General !Cooke cannot be reconciled; for, had Cooke ’scavalry attacked w’here General Porter says it did,it would have been utterly impossible for its lineof retreat to have passed anywhere near the posi-tion of the batteries, and its flight after the repulsecould have had no effect whatever upon the lossof the guns. Hood’s and Law’s line of advance wasdirectly across the plateau from the left center ofPorter ’s original line, where they had broken in,passing south of and near the Watts house on theplateau; and as the cavalry charge was made uponthem, and they captured the guns, it follows that thecharge could only have been made there, and nothalf a mile nearer the Chickahominy, where itwould have been objectless, and indeed ridiculous.

I speak positively on this point, as I was an eye-witness of the whole affair, commanded the troopswho received the charge, and was engaged in thecapture of the guns. Whatever may be said tothe contrary, it is certain that the batteries, hav-ing no infantry supports, did not cheek our advancefor a moment. The diversion by the cavalry, onthe other hand, did delay their capture for theshort period it took to repulse it, and gave time forthe artillerists to save some of their guns.

While these events were taking place on the pla-teau, heavy firing was going on immediately uponthe left of the gap in the Federal line through iwhich we had passed, now some distance in our j,rear. As the front was clear, my brigade was \halted and re-formed. This had scarcely been jdone when a Confederate cheer rose from thewoods in the direction of the firing, and a largebody of Federals rushed out upon the plateau onour left and rear, retreating rapidly and in greatconfusion. Part of them passed to our left, whilethe greater portion were running across our rear inthe attempt to escape to the Chickahominy swampin that direction. My rear rank was faced about,and they were called on to surrender. No atten- ition was paid to the first summons, and a few shots ;were fired into our ranks. A volley from our rearrank, which now faced them, induced them tolisten to reason, and they at once threw downtheir arms in token of surrender.-^- The 1 st and5th Texas regiments and the Hampton Legion(Hood’s brigade), which it will be remembered wereon the left of Law’s brigade in the original line of

were the last to leave the front, and only did so when wefound that the rest of the army had given way, and we wereliterally surrounded by the infantry and batteries of theConfederate forces.

" Being in the woods, and trusting to our superior officersto inform us when to retreat, and not being able to see onaccount of the woods what was going on toward our rightand left, we continued fighting probably an hour after everyother regiment had left the ground. Tile consequence wasinevitable. We were surrounded by ten times our number,and though we could have fought till every man of us wasslain, yet humanity, and, as I think, wisdom, dictated thatwe should at last yield. . . . Our casualties, so far asknown, were: killed, 38; wounded, 111 ,—total 149,—besides75missing, of whom a number probably was killed and wounded.Considering the great jeopardy in which we were, I look uponit as a great mercy we all were not shot down.” Editors.