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Part of Wise’s brigade joined Holmes on the 30th, with two batteries ofartillery and two regiments of cavalry. His entire force then consisted of5820 infantry, 6 batteries of artillery, and 2 regiments of cavalry. Heremained inactive until 4 p. m., when he was told that the Federal armywas passing over Malvern Hill in a demoralized condition. He then openedupon the supposed fugitives with six rifled guns, and was speedily unde-ceived in regard to the disorganization in the Army of the Potomac by areply from thirty guns, which in a brief time silenced his own. The audacityof the Federals and the large number of their guns (which had gone in ad-vance of the main body of Porter’s corps) made G-eneral Holmes believe thathe was about to be attacked, and he called for assistance, and, by Longstreet’sorder, Magruder was sent to him. After a weary march, Magruder wasrecalled to aid Longstreet; but the day was spent in fruitless marching andcountermarching, so that his fine body of troops took no part in what mighthave been a decisive battle at Frayser’s farm. Gieneral Holmes was a veteransoldier of well-known personal courage, hut he was deceived as to thestrength and intentions of the enemy. General Porter says that the forceopposed to General Holmes consisted of Warren’s brigade and the EleventhU. S. Infantry; in all, 1500 infantry and 30 pieces of artillery. Here wasafforded an example of the proneness to overestimate the number oftroops opposed to us. The Federals reported Holmes to have 25,000 men,and he thought himself confronted by a large part of McClellan ’s army. Thatnight he fell back to a stronger position,☆ thinking apparently that therewould be an “ on to Richmond ” movement by the River road. He lost 2killed, 49 wounded, 2 pieces of artillery, and 6 caissons. The guns andcaissons, General Porter states, were afterward abandoned by the Federals.General Holmes occupied the extreme Confederate right the next day, July1st, but he took no part in the attack upon Malvern Hill, believing, as he saysin his official report, “ that it was out of the question to attack the strongposition of Malvern Hill from that side with my inadequate force.”
Mahone’s brigade had some skirmishing with Slocum’s Federal division onthe 30th, but nothing else was done on that day by Huger’s division. Thusit happened that Longstreet and A. P. Hill , with the fragments of their divis-ions which had been engaged at Gaines’s Mill, were struggling alone, whileJackson’s whole corps and the divisions of Huger, Magruder, Holmes, Mc-Laws, and my own were near by.
Jackson moved over the swamp early on the first of July, Whiting’s divisionleading. Our march was much delayed by the crossing of troops and trains.At Willis’s Church I met General Lee . He bore grandly his terrible dis-appointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it. I gave him Mr.Allen’s description of Malvern Hill, and presumed to say, “ If General Mc-Clellan is there in force, we had better let him alone.” Longstreet laughedand said, “ Don’t get scared, now that we have got him whipped.” It was thisbelief in the demoralization of the Federal army that made our leader risk theattack. It was near noon when Jackson reached the immediate neighbor-
■&Half a mile below the upper gate at Curl’s Neck. (See “Official Records,” Vol. XI.,
Part II., p. 908.)—D. H. H.