THE BATTLE OF MALVERN -HILL.

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the river, which we attributed, with the utmost unconcern, to the movementsof troops seeking to interrupt our already abandoned communications withYork River. The absence of any indication of our intention to maintainthose communications, together with the rumble of our artillery, which thatnight was moving southward, opened the eyes of our opponents to the fact thatwe had accomplished the desired and perhaps necessary object of withdraw-ing to the south bank of the Chicka hominy, and for the first time had arousedtheir suspicion that we were either intending to attack Richmond or tem-porarily abandon the siege, during a change of base to the James River. Butthe active spurts on the 27tli and 28th of June made by the defenders of thatcity against our left created the false impression that they designed to attackthe Second, Third, and Fourth Corps, and thereby succeeded in preventing anattack upon them. So, in order to thwart our plans, whatever they mightbe, promptly on the 29th our opponents renewed their activity by advancingfrom Richmond , and by recrossing to the south bank of the river all theirforces lately employed at Gaines’s Mill. But at that time the main body ofour army was beyond their immediate reach, taking positions to cover thepassage of our trains to the new base and to be ready again to welcome oureager and earnest antagonists.

Between 2 and 9 p. m. on the 28th, my corps was in motion and marchedby the way of Savage Station to the south side of White Oak Swamp; andat the junction of the roads from Richmond (Glendale) to be prepared torepel attacks from the direction of that city. General Morell, leading theadvance, aided General Woodbury, of the engineer corps, to build the cause-ways and bridges necessary for the easy passage of the trains and troops overthe swamps and streams. Sykes and McCall followed at 5 and 9 o’clock,respectively, McCall being accompanied by Hunt’s Artillery Reserve. Weexpected to reach our destination, which was only ten miles distant, early onthe 29th; but, in consequence of the dark night and of the narrow and muddyroads, cut up and blocked by numerous trains and herds of cattle, the headof the columu did not arrive till 10 a. m., the rear not until midnight. McCallarrived latest, and all were greatly fatigued.

The enemy not having appeared at Glendale on the afternoon of the 29th,and other troops arriving to take the place of mine, General McClellan ordered me to move that night by the direct road to the elevated and clearedlands (Malvern Hill) on the north bank of Turkey Creek, there to select andhold a position behind which the army and all its trains could be withdrawnwith safety. General Keyes was to move by a different road and form to myright and rear.

Again the dangers and difficulties of night marches attended us, followedby the consequent delay, which, though fortunately it was counterbalancedby the slowness of our opponents in moving to the same point, endangeredthe safety of our whole army. Although we started before dark, and wereled by an intelligent cavalry officer who had passed over the route and pro-fessed to know it, my command did not reach Turkey Creek, which was onlyfive miles distant, until 9 a. m. on the 30th. In fact, we were misled up the