THE BATTLE OF MALI/ERA HILL.

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over the day’s success. By these officers I sent messages to the commandinggeneral, expressing the hope that our withdrawal had ended and that weshould hold the ground we now occupied, even if we did not assume theoffensive. From my standpoint I thought we could maintain our position,and perhaps in a few days could improve it by advancing. But I knew onlythe circumstances before me, and these were limited by controlling influ-ences. It was now after 9 o’clock at night. Within an hour of the time thatColonels Hunt and Colburn left me, and before they could have reached thecommanding general, I received orders from him to withdraw, and to directGenerals Sumner and Heintzelman to move at specified hours to Harrison’sLanding and General Couch to rejoin his corps, which was then under wayto the same point.

These orders were immediately sent to the proper officers, and by day-break, July 2d, our troops, preceded by their trains, were well on their wayto their destination, which they reached that day, greatly wearied after ahard march over muddy roads, in the midst of a heavy rain. That night,freed from care and oblivious of danger, all slept a long sleep; and theyawoke the next morning with the clear sun, a happier, brighter, and strongerbody of men than that which all the day before, depressed and fatigued, hadshivered in the rain.

The conduct of the rear-guard was intrusted to Colonel Averell, com-mander of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, sustained by Colonel Buchanan,with his brigade of regulars, and the 67th Hew York Regiment. No tryingtrust was ever better bestowed or more satisfactorily fulfilled. At daybreakColonel Averell found himself accidentally without artillery to protect hiscommand in its difficult task of preventing an attack before our rear was wellout of range. He at once arranged his cavalry in bodies to represent horse-batteries, and, manoeuvring them to create the impression that they wereartillery ready for action, he secured himself from attack until the rest of thearmy and trains had passed sufficiently to the rear to permit him to retirerapidly without molestation. His stratagem was successful, and without losshe rejoined the main body of the army that night. Thus ended the memo-rable “ Seven Days’ battles,” which, for severity and for stubborn resistanceand endurance of hardships by the contestants, were not surpassed duringthe war. Each antagonist accomplished the result for which he aimed: oneinsuring the temporary relief of Richmond; the other gaining security on thenorth bank of the James, where the Union army, if our civil and militaryauthorities were disposed, could be promptly reenforced, and from whenceonly, as subsequent events proved, it could renew the contest successfully.Preparations were commenced and dispositions were at once made under

The order referred to read as follows: orders. Coimmmieate these instructions to him at once.

“ Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 9 p. m., July Tlie corps of Heintzelman and Sumner will move next.1st, 1862 ; Brigadier-General F. J. Porter, Command- Please communicate to General Heintzelman the time ofing Fifth Provisional Corps.—General : The Gen- your moving. Additional gun-boats, supplies, and reen-eral Commanding desires you to move your command at forcements will he met at Harrison’s Bar. Stimulateonce, the artillery reserve moving first to Harrison’s your men by informing them that reenforcements, etc.,Bar. In case you should find it impossible to move your have arrived at our new base. By command of Major-lieavy artillery, you are to spike tlie guns and destroy General McClellan , James A. Hardie, Lieutenant-the carriages. Couch ’s command will move under your Colonel, A. D. C., A. A. A. G.”