THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
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having passed Salem and Rectortown the day before were in rapid march inthe direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction, and seeing that none ofthe reenforcements promised me were likely to arrive, I determined to aban-don the line of the Rappahannock and communications with Fredericksburg,and concentrate my whole force in the direction of Warrenton and Gaines-ville , to cover the Warrenton pike, and still to confront the enemy rapidlymarching to my right. J
Stonewall Jackson ’s movement on Manassas Junction was plainly seen andpromptly reported, and I notified General Halleck of it. He informed me onthe 23d of August that heavy reenforcements would begin to arrive at War-renton Junction on the next day (24th), and as my orders still held me to theRappahannock I naturally supposed that these troops would be hurried for-ward to me with all speed. Franklin’s corps especially, I asked, should besent rapidly to Gainesville. I also telegraphed Colonel Herman Haupt, chief of railway transportation, to direct one of the strongest divisions comingforward, and to be at Warrenton Junction on the 24th, to be put in theworks at Manassas Junction. A cavalry force had been sent forward toobserve the Thoroughfare Gap early on the morning of the 26th, but noth-ing was heard from it. J,
On the night of August 26th Jackson ’s advance, having passed Thorough-fare Gap, struck the Orange and Alexandria railroad at Manassas Junction,and made it plain to me that all of the reenforcements and movements of thetroops promised me had altogether failed. | Had Franklin been even at Cen-treville, or had Cox’s and Sturgis’s divisions been as far west as Bull Run onthat day, the movement of Jackson on Manassas Junction would not havebeen practicable.
As Jackson ’s movement on Manassas Junction marks the beginning of thesecond battle of Bull Run, it is essential to a clear understanding of subse-quent operations to give the positions of the army under my command onthe night of August 26th, as also the movements and operations of the enemyas far as we knew them.
j Reynolds’s division of Porter’s corps, havingarrived at Aquia on August 13th and 20th, joinedGeneral Pope on the 22d, and was assigned toMcDowell’s corps. General Porter reported toGeneral Burnside (who had arrived at Aquia onAugust 5th with about 12,000 men from NorthCarolina ) for orders on the 21st. Being pushedout toward the Upper Rappahannock to connectwith Reno , his advance under Morel], on the 24th,found Reno and Reynolds gone ; no troops of Gen-eral Pope’s were to be seen or heard of (exceptone company of cavalry, afterward discovered,which had been left to guard Kelly’s ford), norwere any orders from General Pope or any in-formation as to his whereabouts received by Gen-eral Porter or General Burnside until the 26th.So far as appears, no information of this move-ment was communicated to General Halleck. Onthe 24th, in reply to General McClellan ’s inquiryfrom Falmouth, 9 :40 P. M., “Please inform moexactly where General Pope’s troops are. . . .
Up to what point is the Orange and Alexandriarailroad now available '? Where are the enemy inforce?” General Halleck telegraphed : “You askme for information which I cannot give. I do notknow either where General Pope is or where theenemy in force is. These are matters which I haveall day been most anxious to ascertain.”— Editors.
3) General Pope’s orders of the 25th disposedhis troops on the line of the Rappahannock, fromWaterloo to Kelly’s Ford, as for an advance to-ward the Rapidan. Reno was ordered back toKelly’s Ford to resume communication with theforces under Burnside at Falmouth. —Editors.
4 The first information appears to have beenreceived in a communication between the tele-graph operators at Pope ’s headquarters and atManassas Junction, dated 8:20 P. M., on August26th. From this time until the 30th all directcommunication between General Pope and Wash-ington remained cut off, and nothing was heardof him except via Falmouth.— Editors.