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far as he could and rebuild the railroad bridges. Captain Merrill of the Engi-neers was also directed to repair the railroad track and bridges toward Bris-toe. This work was done by that accomplished officer as far east as KettleKun on the 27th, and the trains were run back to that point next morning.
At dark on the 27th Hooker informed me that his ammunition was nearlyexhausted, only five rounds to the man being on hand. Before this time ithad become apparent that Jackson, with his whole force, was south of theWarrenton pike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction .
McDowell reached his position at Gainesville during the night of the 27th,and Kearny and Reno theirs at Greenwich. It -was clear on that night thatwe had completely interposed between Jackson and the enemy’s main body,which was still west of the Bull Run range, and in the vicinity of White Plains .
In consequence of Hooker’s report, and the weakness of the small divisionwhich he commanded, and to strengthen my right wing moving in the direc-tion of Manassas , I sent orders to Porter at dark, which reached him at 9p. m., to move forward from Warrenton Junction at 1 a. m. night, and to reportto me at Bristoe Station by daylight next morning (August 28th).
There were but two courses left to Jackson by this sudden movement ofthe army. He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville , as that placewas occupied by McDowell with a force equal if not superior to his own. Toretreat through Centreville would carry him still farther away from the mainbody of Lee’s army. It was possible, however, to mass his whole force atManassas Junction and assail our right (Hooker’s division), which had foughta severe battle that afternoon, and was almost out of ammunition. Jackson,with A. P. Hill ’s division, retired through Centreville. Thinking it altogetherwithin the probabilities that he might adopt the other alternative, I sent theorders above mentioned to General Porter. He neither obeyed them norattempted to obey them, A but afterward gave as a reason for not.doing so thathis men were tired, the night was too dark to march, and that there was awagon train on the road toward Bristoe. The distance w T as nine miles alongthe railroad track, with a wagon road on each side of it most of the way; buthis corps did not reach Bristoe Station until 10:30 o’clock next morning, sixhours after daylight; and the moment he found that the enemy had left ourfront he asked to halt and rest his corps. Of his first reason for not comply-ing with my orders, it is only necessary to say that Sykes’s division hadreached Warrenton Junction at 11 o’clock on the morning of the 27th, andhad been in camp all day. Morell’s division arrived later in the day at War-renton Junction, and would have been in camp for at least eight hours beforethe time it was ordered to march. The marches of these two divisions fromFredericksburg had been extremely deliberate, and involved but little moreexercise than is needed for good health. The diaries of these marches make
■fe Porter marched about 3 A. M., instead of at 1, him.” Two oi’ders addressed by Pope at Bristoeas ordered. The leading brigade lit candles to look to McDowell at Gainesville fell into the hands offor the road. On the Confederate side Colonel A. P. Hill , at Centreville. Some of the Confed-Henry Forno, 5th Louisiana, reports: “After erates (Jackson, Trimble, and Stuart)mention the12 o’clock at night of the 27th, the brigade was darkness of the night of the 26th; and Generalput in motion with orders to follow General Early, McDowell lost his way from this cause on thebut owing to the darkness I was unable to find night of the 28th.— Editors.