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left Manassas Junction , however, for Centreville. Hearing the sound ofthe guns indicating King’s engagement with the enemy, McDowell set off torejoin his command, but lost his way, and I first heard of him next morningat Manassas Junction . As his troops did not know of his absence, therewas no one to give orders to Sigel and Reynolds.
The engagement of King’s division was reported to me about 10 o’clock atnight near Centreville. I felt sure then, and so stated, that there was no escapefor Jackson. On the west of him were McDowell’s corps (I did not then knowthat he had detached Ricketts \), Sigel’s corps, and Reynolds’s division, allunder command of McDowell. On the east of him, and with the advance ofKearny nearly in contact with him on the Warrenton pike, were the corps ofReno and Heintzelman. Porter was supposed to be at Manassas Junction ,where he ought to have been on that afternoon.
I sent orders to McDowell (supposing him to be with his command), andalso direct to General King, | several times during that night and once by hisown staff-officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, to prevent the retreat ofJackson toward Lee, and that at daylight our whole force from Centrevilleand Manassas would assail him from the east, and he would be crushedbetween us. I sent orders also to General Kearny at Centreville to move for-ward cautiously that night along the Warrenton pike; to drive in the picketsof the enemy, and to keep as closely as possible in contact with him duringthe night, resting his left on the Warrenton pike and throwing his right tothe north, if practicable, as far as the Little River pike, and at daylight nextmorning to assault vigorously with his right advance, and that Hooker andReno would certainly be with him shortly after daylight. I sent orders toGeneral Porter, who I supposed was at Manassas Junction , to move uponCentreville at dawn, stating to him the position of our forces, and that asevere battle would be fought that morning (the 29th).
With Jackson at and near Groveton, with McDowell on the west, and therest of the army on the east of him, while Lee, with the mass of his army, wasstill west of Thoroughfare Gap, the situation for us was certainly as favorableas the most sanguine person could desire, and the prospect of crushing Jack-son, sandwiched between such forces, were certainly excellent. There is nodoubt, had General McDowell been with his command when King’s divisionof his corps became engaged with the enemy, he would have brought forwardto its support both Sigel and Reynolds, and the result would have been tohold the ground west of Jackson at least until morning brought against himalso the forces moving from the direction of Centreville.
division to near Manassas”; and in compliance General Pope’s orders to move on Manassas withwith General Pope’s request of 1:20 or 2 P. M., his whole command. But for this, the movementviz., “ Give me your views fully ; you know the on Manassas as ordered in the morning, as well ascountry much better than I do.” General Me- the movement on Centreville as ordered in theDowell found Reynolds at daybreak on the 29th.— afternoon, would have left no troops exceptEditors. Buford’s broken down cavalry between Longstreet
\ In the exercise of his discretion McDowell, and Jackson, or between Longstreet and Pope ’sthen commanding two corps, sent Ricketts to left.— Editors.
Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 28th, to f But see Captain Charles King’s denial on pagedelay Longstreet’s advance, notwithstanding 495.— Editors.