OUR MARCH AGAINST POPE.
523
early in the afternoon. In that eventPorter would have had a fine oppor-tunity to take me on the wing andstrike a fearful blow. As it was, hewas a check upon my move againstPope ’s main position. If I had ad-vanced upon Pope I would havebeen under an enfilade fire from Por-ter’s batteries, and if I had advancedupon Porter I would have been un-der a fire from the batteries onPope ’s front as severe as the rakingfire from my batteries the next day,when Pope was massed againstJackson. Had Porter attacked mebetween noon and night on the 29th,
I should have received his nine thou-sand with about double that num-ber. I would have held my line toreceive the attack, and as soon ashis line developed his strength Iwould have thrown three brigadesforward beyond his extreme left,up the attack, as it certainly would have done, these three brigades wouldhave been thrown forward at the flank, and at the same time my main linewould have pushed on in the pursuit. The result would have been Por-ter’s retreat in confusion, and I might possibly have reached Pope ’s leftand rear in time to cut him off. When his army was well concentrated onthe 30th he was badly cut up and defeated. It does not seem unreason-able to conclude that attack on the 29th in his disjointed condition wouldhave been attended with more disastrous results to him. If I had beenattacked under the 4:30 order [see p. 475] the result might have been lessdamaging, as Porter would have had the night to cover his retreat, and theFederal army could have availed itself of the darkness to screen its moveacross Bull Run. But Porter’s attack at night, if not followed by the backretreat of the army, would have drawn me around the Federal left and putme in a position for striking the next day.
Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee ’s staff, in his evidence before theFitz John Porter Board, puts my forces on the 29th at 30,000. It is difficult tosee how Porter with 9000 men was to march over 30,000 of the best soldiersthe world ever knew. Any move that would have precipitated battle wouldhave been to our advantage, as we were ready at all points and waiting for anopportunity to fight. The situation will be better understood when we reflectthat the armies were too evenly balanced to admit mistakes on either side. Iwas waiting for an opportunity to get into the Federal lines close uponthe heels of their own troops. The opportunity came on the 30th, but the
lillsil
When my line of battle had broken