548

FROM THE PENINSULA TO ANTIETAM.

Peninsula ; the army was once more in condition to undertake any operationjustified by its numbers, and was in an excellent position to advance byeither bank of the James. [End of finished draft.]

It was at last upon its true line of operations, which I had been unable toadopt at an earlier day in consequence of the Secretary of War’s peremptoryorder of the 18th of May requiring the right wing to be extended to thenorth of Richmond in order to establish communication with GeneralMcDowell. General McDowell was then under orders to advance fromFredericksburg, but never came, because, in spite of his earnest protest, theseorders were countermanded from Wasliington, and he was sent upon a fruit-less expedition toward the Shenandoah instead of being permitted to joinine, as he could have done, at the time of the affair of Hanover Court House.

I urged in vain that the Army of the Potomac should remain on the line ofthe James, and that it should resume the offensive as soon as reenforced tothe full extent of the means in possession of the Government. Had the Armyof the Potomac been permitted to remain on the line of the James, I wouldhave crossed to the south bank of that river, and while engaging Lee’s atten-tion in front of Malvern, would have made a rapid movement in force on Peters-burg, having gained which, I would have operated against Richmond and itscommunications from the west, having already gained those from the south.

Subsequent events proved that Lee did not move northward from Rich-mond with his army until assured that the Army of the Potomac was actuallyon its way to Fort Monroe; and they also proved that so long as the Army ofthe Potomac was on the James, Washington and Mai’yland would have beenentirely safe under the protection of the fortifications and a comparativelysmall part of the troops then in that vicinity; so that Burnside’s troops anda large part of the Union Army of Virginia might, with entire propriety,have been sent by water to join the army under my command, which—withdetachments from the West—could easily have been brought up to more than100,000 men disposable on the actual field of battle.

In spite of my most pressing and oft-repeated entreaties, the order wasinsisted upon for the abandonment of the Peninsula line and the return ofthe Army of the Potomac to Washington in order to support General Pope,who was in no danger so long as the Army of the Potomac remained on theJames. With a heavy heart I relinquished the position gained at the costof so much time and blood.

As aii evidence of my good faith in opposing this movement it should bementioned that General Halleck had assured me, verbally and in writing, thatI was to command all the troops in front of Washington, including those ofGenerals Burnside and Pope —a promise that was not carried into effect.

As the different divisions of the Army of the Potomac reached AquiaCreek and the vicinity of Washington they were removed from my command,even to my personal escort and camp guard, so that on the 30th of August,in reply to a telegram from him, I telegraphed General Halleck from Alex-andria, “ I have no sharp-shooters except the guard around my camp. I have