554

FROM THE PENINSULA TO ANTIETAM.

desperate fighting and severe marches in the unhealthy regions of the Chicka-hominy and afterward, during the second Bull Bun campaign; its trains,administration services and supplies were disorganized or lacking in conse-quence of the rapidity and manner of its removal from the Peninsula as wellas from the nature of its operations during the second Bull Bun campaign.In the departure from the Peninsula, trains, supplies, cavalry, and artilleryin many instances had necessarily been left at Port Monroe and Yorktown forlack of vessels, as the important point was to remove the infantry divisionsrapidly to the support of General Pope. The divisions of the Army of Vir-ginia were also exhausted and weakened, and their trains were disorganizedand their supplies deficient by reason of the movements in which they hadbeen engaged.

Had General Lee remained in front of Washington it would have been thepart of wisdom to hold our own army quiet until its pressing wants werefully supplied, its organization was restored, and its ranks were filled withrecruits — in brief, until it was prepared for a campaign. But as the enemymaintained the offensive and crossed the Upper Potomac to threaten orinvade Pennsylvania , it became necessary to meet him at any cost notwith-standing the condition of the troops, to put a stop to the invasion, saveBaltimore and Washington, and throw him back across the Potomac. Nothingbut sheer necessity justified the advance of the Army of the Potomac toSouth Mountain and Antietam in its then condition, and it is to the eternalhonor of the brave men who composed it that under such adverse circum-stances they gained those victories. The work of supply and reorganizationwas continued as best we might while on the march, and even after the closeof the battles [September 14th-17th] so much remained to be done to placethe army in condition for a campaign, that the delay which ensued was abso-lutely unavoidable, and the army could not have entered upon a new cam-paign one day earlier than it did. It must then be borne constantly in mindthat the purpose of advancing from Washington was simply to meet thenecessities of the moment by frustrating Lee ’s invasion of the Northern States,and, when that was accomplished, to push with the utmost rapidity the work ofreorganization and supply so that a new campaign might be promptly inaugu-rated with the army in condition to prosecute it to a successful terminationwithout intermission.

The advance from Washington was covered by the cavalry, under Gen-eral Pleasonton, which was pushed as far to the front as possible, and wassoon in constant contact with the enemy’s cavalry, with whom several well-conducted and successful affairs occurred.

Partly in order to move men freely and rapidly, partly in consequence of thelack of accurate information as to the exact position and intention of Lee ’sarmy, the troops advanced by three main roads : that part near the Potomac byOffutt’s Cross Boads and the mouth of the Seneca; that by Bockville to Fred-erick, and that by Brookville and Urbana to New Market. We were then incondition to act according to the development of the enemy’s plans and to con-centrate rapidly in any position. If Lee threatened our left flank by moving