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THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR BOONSBORO’.

very large force opposed to them, whereas there was only one weak divisionuntil late in the afternoon. They might have brushed it aside almost withouthalting, but for this illusion. It was a battle of delusions also, for, by movingabout from point to point and meeting the foe wherever he presented h i m self,the Confederates deluded the Federals into the belief that the whole mountainwas swarming with rebels. I will endeavor to explain the singular features ofthe battle and what caused them.

In the retirement of Lee’s army from Frederick to Hagerstown and Boons-boro’, my division constituted the rear-guard. It consisted of five brigades(Wise’s brigade being left behind), and after the arrival at Boonsboro’ wasintrusted with guarding the wagon trains and parks of artillery belonging tothe whole army. Longstreet’s corps went to Hagerstown , thirteen miles fromBoonsboro’, and I was directed to distribute my five brigades so as not onlyto protect the wagons and guns, but also to watch all the roads leading fromHarper’s Ferry , in order to intercept the Federal forces that might maketheir escape before Jackson had completed the investment of that place. Itrequired a considerable separation of my small command to accomplish thesetwo objects, and my tent, which was pitched about the center of the five bri-gades, was not less than three miles from Turner’s Gap on the National roadcrossing South Mountain.

During the forenoon of the 13th General Stuart, who was in an advanceposition at the gap in the Catoctin Mountain, east of Middletown, with ourcavalry, sent a dispatch to me saying that he was followed by two bri-gades of Federal infantry, and asking me to send him a brigade to check thepursuit at South Mountain. I sent him the brigades of Colquitt and Gar-land, and the batteries of Bondurant and Lane, with four guns each. Plea-sonton’s Federal cavalry division came up to the mountain and pressed ontill our infantry forces were displayed, when it returned without fighting.The Confederates, with more than half of Lee’s army at Harper’s Ferry, ,distant a march of two days, and with the remainder divided into two parts,,thirteen miles from each other, were in good condition to be beaten in detail,scattered and captured. General Longstreet writes to me that he urgedGeneral Lee in the evening of the 13tli to unite at Sharpsburg the troops-which were then at Hagerstown and Boonsboro’. He said that he couldeffect more with one-third of his own corps, fresh and rested, than with thewhole of it, when exhausted by a forced march to join their comrades..That night, finding that he could not rest, General Longstreet rose and wroteto his commander, presenting his views once more, favoring the abandonmentof the defense of the mountain except by Stuart and the concentration at-Sharpsburg.

I received a note about midnight of the 13th from General Lee saying thathe was not satisfied with the condition of things on the turnpike o\- Nationalroad, and directing me to go in person to Turner’s Gap the next morning andassist Stuart in its defense. In his official report General Lee says:

“ Learning that Harper’s Ferry had not surrendered and that the enemy was advancing morerapidly than was convenient from Fredericktown, I determined to return with Longstreet’s com-