THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR BOONSBORO’. 565

sight inspired more satisfaction than discomfort; for though I knew that mylittle force could be brushed away as readily as the strong man can brushto one side the wasp or the hornet, I felt that G-eneral McClellan hadmade a mistake, and I hoped to be able to delay him until G-eneral Long-street could come up and our trains could be extricated from their perilousposition.

When two distinct roars of artillery were heard south of us that morning,I thought that the nearer one indicated that McClellan was forcing his wayacross some gap north of Harper’s Ferry with a view of cutting Lee’s armyin two. I suppose that Stuart believed that this would be the movement ofthe enemy, and for this reason abandoned Turner’s Gap and hastened towhat he believed to be the point of danger. McClellan was too cautious aman for so daring a venture. J Had he made it, Jackson could have escapedacross the Potomac , but the force under Lee in person (Longstreet’s corpsand my division) must have been caught. My division was very small andwas embarrassed with the wagon trains and artillery of the whole army, savesuch as Jackson had taken with him. It must be remembered that the armynow before McClellan had been constantly marching and fighting since the25th of June. It had fought McClellan’s army from Richmond to the James,and then had turned about and fought Pope ’s army, reenforced by parts ofMcClellan’s, from the Rapidan to the Potomac . The order excusing barefootedmen from marching into Maryland had sent thousands to the rear. Divisionshad become smaller than brigades were when the fighting first began; bri-gades had become smaller than regiments, and regiments had become smallerthan companies.& Dabney, a careful statistician, in his “Life of Jackson,”estimates Lee’s forces at Sharpsburg (Antietam) at 33,000 men, includingthe three arms of service. | Three of Longstreet’s twelve brigades hadgone to Harper’s Ferry with Jackson. He (Longstreet) puts the strengthof his nine brigades at Hagerstown on the morning of the 14th of Sep-tember at thirteen thousand men. Accepting the correctness of his esti-mate for the present (though I expect to prove it to be too large), I findthat Lee had under his immediate command that morning but eighteenthousand men.

McClellan gives his force at Sharpsburg at 87,164. Had he made the move-ment which Stuart and myself thought he was making, it was hardly possiblefor the little force under Lee in person to have escaped, encumbered as itwas with wagon trains and reserve artillery. Forming his infantry into asolid column of attack, Lee might have cut a way through the five-foldforce of his antagonist, but all the trains must have been lost,— an irre-parable loss to the South. Frederick the Great ’s campaign against the allies

jSee General Franklin’s paper on the engage- j According to Thomas White, Chief Clerk in the

ment at Crampton’s Gap, p. 591.— Editors. Adjutant-General’s Office at Lee’s headquarters,

3>Thus the 18th Virginia Regiment (p. 899, General Lee had 33,000 infantry at Sharpsburg, orVol. XIX., of the “Official Records”) is put 41,500 of all arms. Adding 2000 for the previousat 120 men; 56th Virginia Regiment at 80; casualties (only partly given), the total Confeder-8th Virginia at 34; Hampton Legion (p. 931) ate force on the 14th would appear to be 43,500,at 77; 17th South Carolina Regiment at 59 (p. of which 15,000 were at Harper’s Ferry , on the946).—D. H. H. Virginia side, and 28,500 in Maryland.— Editors.