THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR BOONSBORO’. 567

their battery to a new position on a ridge more to the front and right, formingtheir infantry in support and moving columns toward both our flanks.”

It was more than half an hour after the utter rout and dispersion ofGarland’s brigade when G. B. Anderson arrived at the head of his small butfine body of men. ☆ He made an effort to recover the ground lost by Garland,but failed and met a serious repulse. General Cox says of this attack: “ Theenemy made several attempts to retake the crest, advancing with greatobstinacy and boldness.”

Under the strange illusion that there was a large Confederate force on themountain, the Federals withdrew to their first position in the morning toawait the arrival of the other three divisions of Beno’s corps. Willcox’sarrived about noon, and Sturgis’s and Bodman’s between 3 and 4 o’clock,but there was no advance until 5 p. m. The falling back of Cox’s division isalluded to by Colonel Ewing of Scammon’s brigade and by Major Lyman J.Jackson of Crook’s brigade. The former says: “ We fell back to the originalposition until the general advance at 5 p. m.” Major Jackson, after speakingof fighting the enemy behind a stone-wall with the cooperation of two otherregiments, adds: “We then fell back to the hillside in the open fields, wherewe were out of reach of their guns, and remained here with the rest of ourbrigade until an advance was made against the enemy by the Pennsylvania and Bhode Island troops on our right.”

After the arrival of his whole corps General Beno arranged his line of battleas follows : Cox’s division on the left, resting on the batteries already in posi-tion ; Willcox’s on the right, supported by the division of Sturgis. Bodman’sdivision was divided; Fairchild’s brigade was sent to the extreme left to sup-port the batteries, and Harlaud’s was placed on the extreme right.

In the meantime Bodes and Bipley, of my division, reported to me fororders. Bodes was sent with his brigade of twelve hundred men to a com-manding knoll north of the pike or National road. Bipley was directed toattach himself to G. B. Anderson’s left. Anderson, being thus strengthened,and finding there was no enemy in his immediate front, sent out the 2d and4tlx North Carolina regiments of his brigade on a reconnoissanee to the front,right, and rear. Captain E. A. Osborne, commanding the skirmishers of the4th North Carolina , discovered a brigade in an old field south of Fox’s Gap,facing toward the turnpike and supporting a battery with its guns turned inthe same direction. Captain Osborne hastened back to Colonel Grimes, com-manding the regiment, and told him that they could deliver a flank fire uponthe brigade before it could change its position to meet them. But a Federal

General Hill in his official report thus de-scribes the posting o£ his forces after the defeat ofGarland: “There were two mountain roads prac-ticable for artillery on the right of the main turn-pike. The defense of the farther one had costGarland his life. It was now intrusted to ColonelRosser of the cavalry, who had reported to me,and who had artillery and dismounted sharp-shooters. General Anderson was intrusted withthe care of the nearest and best road. Bondurant’s

battery was sent to aid him in its defense. Thebi'igade of Colquitt was disposed on each side ofthe turnpike, and that with Lane’s battery wasjudged adequate to the task. There was, however,a solitary peak on the left, which, if gained by theYankees , would give them control of the ridgecommanding the turnpike. I had a large numberof guns from Cutts’s artillery placed upon the hill. . . to sweep the approaches. . . . Rodes andRipley came up soon after Anderson.”— Editors.