THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR BOONSBORO

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FOX’S GAP —THE APPROACH TO WISE’S FIELD.

This sketch and the one on the next page (from photographs made in 1885) may be regarded as parts of one picture.The old Sharpsburg or Braddock road lies between the stone-wall and the rail fence. The left distanceshows the Middletown valley and the Catoctin range, from which Reno approached.— Editors.

regiments and one Indiana regiment, from Hatch’s division, and directed itto move directly up the pike with a section of artillery. Then the divisionsof Meade and Hatch were formed on the north side of the pike, with the divis-ion of Ricketts in supporting distance in rear. A belt of woods had to bepassed through, and then it was open field all the way to the summit, and thetwo detached peaks were in full view upon which the devoted little band ofRodes was posted — the 12th Alabama Regiment on one, and the 3d, 5th, 6th,and 26th Alabama regiments on the other. Under the illusion that therewere ten regiments and one battalion of Longstreet’s command in those woods,the progress through them was slow, but, when once cleared, the advance wassteady and made almost with the precision of movement of a parade day.Captain Robert E. Park, of Macon, Georgia , who commanded the fortyskirmishers in the woods, thinks that he delayed the Federal advance for along time. 1

It is not more improbable that a few active skirmishers north of the pikeshould prove an obstacle to progress through the forest there, than that a

| Captain Park writes:

“After passing through Boonsboro’, en route to thescene of action, we met the dead body of the gallantGeneral Garland, when an order from General D H.Hill, through General R. E. Rodes, to Colonel B. B.Gayle of the 12th Alabama , directed that skirmishersshould be deployed in front. Colonel Gayle hurriedly or-dered captains of companies to send four men each tothe front to report to Lieutenant R. E. Park as sharp-shooters, and I promptly reported for orders; was di-rected to carry my squad of forty men to the foot ofSouth Mountain, ‘ and keep the enemy back as long aspossible.’ I hastily deployed the men, and we moveddown the mountain-side. On our way down we couldsee the enemy, in two lines of battle, in the valley below,advancing, preceded only a few steps by their dense lineof skirmishers. I concealed my men behind trees, rocks,and bushes, and cautioned them to aim well beforefiriug. We awaited with bcatiug hearts the sure and

steady approach of the ‘ Pennsylvania Bucktails,’ whowere directly in my front, and soon near enough to fireupon. I gave the command, ‘ Fire,’ and forty guns werealmost simultaneously emptied with deadly effect, andthe surviving skirmishers rushed back pell-mell to theirmain line, disordering it greatly. The solid, well-drilledline soon rallied, and advanced steadily forward, andmy small party, as soon as they were near enough, firedagain, and nearly every bullet did fatal work. At leastthirty men must have been killed or wounded at thesecond fire, and perhaps more at the first. Thoughchecked for Borne minutes, the enemy again advanced,their officers earnestly exhorting them with ‘ close up ’and ‘forward.’ I directed my men to fall back slowly,and to fire from everything which -would screen themfrom observation. I had lost only four men woundedup to this time, but six or eight more became demoral-ized and, despite my commands, entreaties, and threats,left me and hastily fled to the rear. With the brave