FORCING FOX’S GAP AND TURNER’S GAP.

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division, the order came to advance the whole line, so as to complete thedislodgment of the enemy from the remaining summit at the MountainHouse. At the center and left the advance was not difficult, for we held theridge and pushed our opponents down the mountain. But the right had stillto climb, and the ground there was rough and rocky, a fortress in itself andstoutly held. Glood progress was made by both Sturgis and Willcox, butthe fastness at the Mountain House had not been carried when darkness fellupon the field. A little before sunset, Reno came up in person, anxious toknow why the right could not get forward quite to the summit. After a fewmoments’ conversation with me he passed on to Sturgis; it seemed to mehe was hardly gone before he was brought back upon a stretcher, dead. Hehad gone to the skirmish line to examine for himself the situation there,and had been shot down by the enemy posted among the rocks and trees.There was more or less firing in that part of the field till late in the evening,but when morning dawned, the Confederates had abandoned the last footholdabove Turner’s Gap.

On the north of the National road the First Corps under Hooker had beenopposed by one of Hill’s brigades and four of Longstreet’s, and had graduallyworked its way along the old Hagerstown road, crossing the heights in thatdirection after dark in the evening. Gibbon’s brigade had advanced alongthe National road, crowding up quite close to Turner’s Gap, and engaging theenemy under Colquitt in a lively combat. It has been my purpose, however,to limit any detailed account to what occurred under my own eye.

The peculiar character of the battle had been that it grew out of what wasintended for a mere reconnoissance. The Kanawha Division had carried thecrest at Fox’s Gap early in the forenoon, while the rest of the army was milesaway. General Hill has since argued that only part of his division could opposeus; but his brigades 'were all on the mountain summit within easy supportof each other, and they had the day before them. It was five hours from thetime of our first charge to the arrival of our first supports, and it was not till3 o’clock in the afternoon that Hooker’s corps reached the eastern base of themountain and began its deployment north of the National road. Our effortwas to attack the weak end of the Confederate line, and we succeeded inputting a stronger force there than that which opposed us. It is for ouropponent to explain how we were permitted to do it. The two brigades of theKanawha Division numbered less than three thousand men. Hill’s divisionwas five thousand strong, even by the Confederate method of counting theireffectives, which should be increased nearly one-fifth to compare properlywith our reports. In addition to these, Stuart had the principal part of theConfederate cavalry on this line, and they were not idle spectators. Part ofLee’s and Hampton’s brigades were certainly there, and probably the wholeof Lee’s. With less than half the numerical strength which was opposed toit, therefore, the Kanawha Division had carried the summit, advancing tothe charge for the most part over open ground in a storm of musketry andartillery fire, and had held the crests they had gained through the livelongday, in spite of all efforts to retake them. The Ninth and the First Corps