would take it as a ruse de guerre, but it seems that General McClellan gave it hisconfidence, and made his dispositions accordingly. He planned his attack uponD. H. Hill under the impression that I was there with 12 brigades, 9 of whichwere really at Hagerstown , while R. H. Anderson’s division was on MarylandHeights with General McLaws. Had McClellan exercised due diligence inseeking information from his own resources, he would have known better the
situation at South Mountain and couldhave enveloped General D. H. Hill’s di-vision on the afternoon of the 13th, orearly on the morning of the 14th, and then
THE OLD LUTHERAN CHURCH, SIIARPSBCJIIG. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
Tlw* cliurch stands at the east end of the village, on Main street, find was a Federal hospital after thebattle. Burnside’s skirmishers gained a hold in the first cross-street below the church, wherethere was considerable fighting. On the hill in the extreme distance Main street becomesthe Shepherdstown road, by which the Confederates retreated.— Editors.
turned upon McLaws at Maryland Heights, before I could have reached eitherpoint. As it was, McClellan , after finding the order, moved with more confi-dence on toward South Mountain, where D. H. Hill was stationed as a Con-federate rear-guard with five thousand men under his command. As I havestated, my command was at Hagerstown, thirteen miles farther on. GeneralLee was with me, and on the night of the 13th we received information thatMcClellan was at the foot of South Mountain with his great army. GeneralLee ordered me to march back to the mountain early the next morning. Isuggested that, instead of meeting McClellan there, we withdraw Hill andunite my forces and Hill’s at Sharpsburg, at the same time explaining thatSharpsburg was a strong defensive position from which we could strike theflank or rear of any force that might be sent to the relief of Harper’s Ferry .I endeavored to show him that by making a forced march to Hill my troopswould be in an exhausted condition and could not make a proper battle.Lee listened patiently enough, but did not change his plans, and directedthat I should go back the next day and make a stand at the mountain.After lying down, my mind was still on the battle of the next day, and I
VOT.. II. 43