CAN BY’S SERVICES IN THE NEW MEXICAN CAMPAIGN.
697
den by a wood through which Generals McDowelland Porter were unable to pass on horseback,and iu which messengers sent by Porter to com-municate with McDowell and others were capturedby the enemy.
The second order did not reach General Porter till 6:30 P. M., and before the dispositions imme-diately ordered to execute it could be completed,darkness interposed. It read :
“ August 29th, 1862—1:30 p. m.“Major-General Porter :
“ Your line of march brings youlnon the enemy’s rightflank. I desire you to push forward into action at onceon the enemy’s flank and, if possible, on his rear, keep-ing your right in communication with General Rey-nolds. The enemy is massed in the woods iu front ofus, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage theirflank. Keep heavy 'reserves and use your batteries,keeping well closed to your right all the time. In caseyou are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear,so as to keep you in close communication with theright wing.”
Both orders are based upon the supposition thatthe enemy was Jackson; that Longstreet was notthere, and would not arrive till the night of the30th or the 31st, and that Jackson was to beattacked in front and flank or rear and crushedbefore Longstreet joined him.
When McDowell came upon the rear of Porter ’stroops near Bethlehem Church he had just receivedBuford’s dispatch of 9: 30 A. M. forwarded by Rick-etts at 11: 30 A. m. This told of Longstreet’spassage through Gainesville before 9 : 30; itreached McDowell after 11:30. When McDowelljoined Porter he found him at the head of histroops, advancing; therefore, when Porter ar-rived on the crest of the hills which descend toDawkin’s Branch, his advance encountered Long-street’s, already in occupation of the opposite slope.
The board of officers say in their report:
“ General Porter ’s conduct was adjudged [by the court-martial] upon the assumption that not more than onedivision under Longstreet had arrived on the Held, andthat Porter had no considerable force In his front.
” The fact is that Longstreet, with four divisions of
tV Ricketts’s dispatch was not produced in evidence. Itstrongly confirms Surgeon R. O. Abbott’s statement that itwas “between 12 and 1 o’clock, toward 1,” when he delivered
25,000 j men, was there on the field before Porter arrivedwith his two divisions of 9000 men; that the Confeder-ate general-ln-ohief was there in person at least two orthree hours before the commander of the Army of Vir-ginia himself arrived on the field, and that Porter withhis two divisions saved the Army of Virginia that dayfrom the disaster naturally duo to the enemy’s earlierpreparations for battle.
“ If the 4:30 order had been promptly delivered a verygrave responsibility would have devolved upon GeneralPorter . The order was based upon conditions whichwere essentially erroneous and upon expectations whichcould not possibly be realized. . . .
“What General Porter actually did do . . . nowseems to have been ouly the simple necessary actionwhich an intelligent soldier had no choice but to take.It is not possible that any court-martial could havecondemned such conduct if it had been correctlyunderstood. O 11 the contrary, that conduct was obe-dient, subordinate, faithful, and judicious. It savedthe Union army from disaster on the 29th of August.”
The board accordingly recommended to Presi-dent Hayes to set aside the findings and sentenceof the court-martial and to restore Porter to hisrank in the service from the date of his dismissal.
In the absence of legislation, President Hayes considered himself as without power to act, and onthe 5th of June, 1879, he submitted the proceed-ings and conclusions of the board for the action ofCongress .
On the 4th of May, 1882, President Arthur , byletters patent, remitted so much of the sentenceof the court as had not been fully executed, andthus relieved General Porter from the continuingdisqualification to hold office.
On the 1st of July, 1886, President Clevelandapproved an act “for the relief of Fitz JohnPorter ” which had been passed in the House ofRepresentatives on the 18th of February by avote of 171 to 113, and in the Senate on the 25thof June by a vote of 30 to 17. In accordancewith the provisions of this act, on the otli of AugustPorter was once more commissioned as colonel ofinfantry in the army of the United States , to rankfrom May 14th, 1861, but without back pay; andon August 7th he was placed on the retired list.
one copy of the “joint order” to Porter , after delivering theother to General McDowell.—R. B. I.
^ According to Col. Marshall of Gen. Lee’s staff, 30,000.
CANBY’S SERVICES IN THE NEW MEXICAN CAMPAIGN.
BY LATHAM ANDERSON, BREVET BRIGAMER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
T he account in this work by Captain Pettis of“ The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona, ” is accurate as to most details. Itis open to criticism, however, in two particulars:it fails to recognize the political as well as themilitary importance of the campaign, and it doesinjustice to General Canby.
The remote and unimportant territory of NewMexico was not the real objective of this invasion.The Confederate leaders were striking at muchhigher game — no less than the conquest of Cali-fornia. Sonora, Chihuahua, New Mexico, Arizona ,and Utah — and, above all, the possession of the
gold supply of the Pacific coast, a source ofstrength considered by Mr. Lincoln to be essentialto the successful prosecution of the war.
The truth of this view will be apparent when weconsider what the relative positions of the two gov-ernments would have been had Sibley succeeded inhis enterprise. The Confederacy would have con-trolled the Gulf of California and the two finestharbors on the Pacific coast with a coast-line of1200 or 1500 miles. The conquest alone of thisvast domain, in all probability,would have insuredthe recognition of the Confederacy by the Euro-pean powers. Owing to the remoteness of this
For Captain Pettis-’s article and accompanying maps, see Vol. II., p. 103.— Eiutous.
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