OPERATIONS IN NORTH ALABAMA.

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difficult to determine when we can halt ”; and in reporting his action he says:“ I am quite certain the enemy will follow.” The next day he concludes thatthe invading force, with reference to which this formidable expedition was seton foot, did not exist. Negley had one man wounded opposite Chattanooga .

The destruction of the Bridgeport and Decatur bridges was not contraryto my orders under certain conditions. General Mitchel’s position was anisolated one. It happened that the Confederate force in East Tennessee atthe' moment was small, but the resources of the enemy were not well under-stood at that early period. By the road to the east Mitchel was exposed towhatever force the enemy might be capable of sending against him, and hewas not within reach of prompt succor even if the troops for that purposecould be spared from the main army on the west side of the Tennessee . Verysoon, therefore, after his arrival at Huntsville , he was authorized to destroythe Bridgeport bridge. But the orders, though ample, were not imperative,as he evidently understood, for in reporting his expedition of the 29th ofApril, he took credit to his command for partially rescuing the bridge fromdestruction by the enemy. He says: “ We can now hold it or destroy it asmay be ordered.” He did not report that upon the withdrawal of his forcethe bridge was totally burned by his order. That action was unnecessary,the bridge having been already sufficiently disabled by the enemy.

There was no necessity for the burning of the Decatur bridge. Mitchelhad been instructed to destroy it in case he should be forced to retire fromhis position in North Alabama, a contingency of which he frequentlyexpressed apprehension; but while he remained, the bridge was so completelyunder his control as to render its destruction unnecessary until the lastmoment. On April 25th Mitchel reported: “ I have determined to withdrawmy troops to the north side of the river, and, if necessary to our safety, todestroy the Decatur bridge.” I never censured him for these acts, and do notnow censure him. I only mean to make a proper account of them. Chan-nels of communication in the field of operations of hostile armies, if notguarded, will generally be obstructed by one side or the other, and it is seldomthat their importance in advance of actual use will warrant the means requi-site for their preservation. These are matters of judgment at the moment, andought not to be too narrowly criticised. A measure which proved in the endto have been superfluous, or even hurtful, may with the evidence at the timehave seemed entirely advisable.

A far more serious fault was the habitual lawlessness that prevailed in aportion of General Mitchel’s command. He has described it himself in adispatch to the Secretary of War: “ The most terrible outrages — robberies,rapes, arsons, and plunderings—are being committed by lawless brigands andvagabonds connected with the army ”; and he asks for authority to visit thepunishment of death upon the offenders. The authority was granted, butnobody was punished. Not only straggling individuals, but a whole brigade,under the open authority of its commander, could engage in these acts.Mitchel’s refinement would be shocked by brutality under any circumstances,but he could not apply the means of repression when his command was the