THE BATTLE OF CORINTH.

747

MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD, LOOKING TOWARD CORINTII — REMAINS OF FORT WILLIAMSON THE RIGHT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

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right (ind attack the enemy on their left flank, reenforced on your right and center. Be carefulnot to get under Davies’s guns. Keep your troops well in hand. Get well this way. Do notextend to your right too much. It looks as if it would be well to occupy the ridge where yourskirmishers were when Colonel Ducat left, by artillery, well supported, but his may be fartherto right than would be safe. Use your discretion. Opposite your center might be better now foryour artillery. If you see your chance, attack fiercely.—W. S. Rosecrans, Brigadier-General.”

I added a sketch of the line on a bit of paper. The delay thus caused enabledthe enemy to overpass the right of Davies so far that while Ducat was return-ing he was fired on by the enemy’s skirmishers, who had reached open groundover the railway between Hamilton and Corinth. Two orderlies sent on thesame errand afterward were killed on the way. Upon the receipt of theseexplanations Hamilton put his division in motion, but by sunset he onlyreached a point opposite the enemy’s left; and after moving down a short dis-tance Sullivan’s brigade, facing to the west, crossed the narrow flats flankingthe railway, went over into the thickets, and had a fierce fight with the enemy’sleft, creating a great commotion. Buford’s brigade had started in too far tothe west and had to rectify its position; so that Hamilton’s division thus farhad only given the enemy a terrific scare, and a sharp fight with one brigade.Had the movement been executed promptly after 3 o’clock, we should havecrushed the enemy’s right and rear. Hamilton’s excuse that he could notunderstand the order shows that even in the rush of battle it may be necessaryto put orders in writing, or to have subordinate commanders who instinctivelyknow or are anxious to seek the key of the battle and hasten to its roar. J*

At nightfall of the 3d it was evident that, unless the enemy should with-draw, he was where I wished him to be—between the two railroad lines

& See General Charles S. Hamilton’s statements, p. 758.— Editors.