I^TOVEMBER 22d, 1862, the whole Union army-LM had reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericks-burg, and General Lee , who had proved upon morethan one occasion his watchfulness and enterprise,took means to insure the arrival, about the sametime, of the Army of Northern Virginia on theheights in the immediate rear of Fredericksburg .
Without the slightest delay the enemy’s line ofdefense was marked out, nor did their labors ceaseuntil their defensive lines were made formidableand complete by the mounting of a large numberof guns. In the meantime the Army of the Potomachad drawn its abundant supply of daily rations, sub-jected itself to some drilling and several reviews,while its commander had been carrying on an ani-mated correspondence with the powers at Wash-ington, chiefly in relation to pontoons which hadbeen promised but had failed to reach Falmouthuntil long after the arrival of both armies at thepoints they then occupied. [See p. 121.] Sometime during the first week in December the mucli-looked-for pontoon train appeared, and then camethe oft-repeated camp rumor of a “movement overthe river,” which in a few days assumed a moredefinite form, the actual plan of attack becomingthe topic of many a camp-fire. It was freely statedthat the whole army was to cross the river aboutsuch a time, and that the chief attack was to bemade by General Sumner’s Right Grand Divisionupon the enemy’s center immediately back of Fred-ericksburg , where the hills were steepest and thefortifications strongest.
There were a few officers in the Army of thePotomac who had watched the gradual growthof the enemy’s lines, and knew something of thenatural formations in that direction,— a suc-cession of steep hills which, in themselves, werealmost as potent for defensive purposes as theaverage artificial fortifications. I, for one, hadbeen over that ground several times the Augustbefore while engaged in ascertaining the bestline for a grand guard for the protection of theroads leading from the back country into Fred-ericksburg . The three or four officers who werepossessed of this knowledge expressed themselvesvery strongly in opposition to the plan of attackas foreshadowed by the gossips of the camp, andthe news of these adverse opinions having come toGeneral Burnside, he sent a circular to the generalofficers of the Right Grand Division and colonelscommanding brigades to meet him at the Phillipshouse on the evening of December Oth. At thetime appointed the large room of that mansion wasfilled with general officers, with here and there acolonel and a few grand division staff-officers. Gen-eral Burnside made a speech in which he partlydisclosed and explained his plan for the comingbattle. It was received without any particular crit-icism or comment, but General French , who wasvery enthusiastic, said the battle would be won inforty-eight hours, and called for three cheers forthe commander, which were given.
The meeting ended, Colonel J. H. Taylor, assist-
ant adjutant-general of the Right Grand Division)and myself were standing together in the hall of thehouse, when General Burnside came along and saidto me, “What do you think of it?” I answered,‘ ‘ If you make the attack as contemplated it wiBbe the greatest slaughter of the war; there isn’tinfantry enough in our whole army to carry thoseheights if they are well defended.” He thenturned to Colonel Taylor and said, “Colonel,what do you say about it ? ” The response caffiequickly and was sufficiently definite, “ I quh eagree with Colonel Hawkins. The carrying out ofyour plan will be murder, not warfare.” The coin'manding general was very much surprised andirritated at these answers, and made a remarkabout my readiness to throw cold water upon h lS“plans”; he repeated the assertion of French aboutvictory within forty-eight hours, and passed on.
The meeting dispersed, the officers who hadcomposed it going to their respective commandsand giving their final orders for the movement ofthe following day. Besides attending to the de-tails of moving my command on the morrow,found time to write three letters — one to ntfmother, another to my wife, and a third to CharlesP. Kirkland, of the city of New York . In each ofthese defeat was distinctly and without qualifi* 5 ®'tion predicted. The first letter in the order men'tioned has been preserved, and from it the follow-ing quotations are given:
“ Camp, near Falmouth, Va. , December lOtli, 1862.
“ Dear Mother —. . . . To-morrow, if our presentplans are carried out, the great battle of the war wijcommence. ... I have little hope of the plans succeed-ing. I do not think them good,—there will ho a gre®loss of life and nothing accomplished. I am sure weto light against all chances of success. There is a rum 0 *and a hope that Banks may have landed on the Jam®River; if so, a large part of the enemy’s force will he di-verted from this point, hut if they havo a force an}'where near our own In numbor wo are pretty certain 1get whipped.”
The letter to Judge Kirkland was much strong eland more explicit, and evoked an answer fi' 01 * 1which one paragraph is quoted:
“New York , Docembor 18 th, 1862.
“ How wonderfully prophetic is your letter, written 00the loth of December. It foretells exactly the aWf®disaster and reverse that our cause lias met with. S°is it possible, if you thus knew all this, that those hf®'ing con trol woro ignorant of it ? Tills whole transact! 0seems now almost, incredible. To think of the thousandof splendid, brave, patriotic follows absolutely buto®ered without, tho least, beneficial result: on the oontraw^with a result disgraceful and disheartening to us, bin*fervently trust a result from which we can recover.”
This matter of the letters is here referred t0 ’not in a spirit of pride, but simply to show a wanof knowledge, judgment, and foresight on thpart of those high in command.
We now pass over the bombardment of Decs® 1ber lltli, the many disastrous attempts to lay ^pontoons in front of Fredericksburg , and come too’clock of that day, when volunteers were called t ^to cross the river in open boats for the purpose
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