FRANKLIN’S “LEFT GRAND DIVISION.”

135

The Sixth Corps had two divisions in line and one in reserve. It remainedM an exposed position during the day, and suffered severely from artilleryfire, while the enemy in its front were well covered by woods and rifle-pits.

I 11 obedience to his orders Reynolds moved to the attack at 8:30 A. m., withfiis center division under Meade, which was to be supported by the division ofGibbon on the right and next to the Sixth Corps. The third division, under■Doubleday, was in reserve and guardingMeade’s left. ☆ Meade crossed the ravine

111 fils front, and directed his course to-

^ard

fr

°ui the heights.

* m

t

A JACK-KNIFE KECORI) ON THE STONE WALLOF THE BERNARD HOUSE.

point of woods coming downThe artillery on theC1 ’est was silenced by three batteries,j>ud Meade pushed on, supported onis right by Gfibbon, and, after severeghting, carried the crest, capturing flagsj^id prisoners. In the dense woods one height, the connection with Gibbon

lost, and Meade, after a stubborn contest, was finally driven back, Gib-011 yet holding his ground. Two regiments from the Third Corps arriving^ ei ‘e sent to Gibbon’s left, but were soon overpowered, and they were forceda °k with Gibbon. The enemy made a strong show of following up theirRecess, but the arrival of two fresh brigades from the Third Corps checked6Da a ud drove them back to their sheltered positions. Gibbon’s division,^ 6r its retreat, was relieved by Sickles’s division of the Third Corps.Eton’s division, the reserves of the Sixth Corps, arrived late in the after-011 and took position on the left, but was not engaged. The enemy’s bat-'les on their extreme right, having a reverse fire upon Meade, when heq Va ueed up the crest, maintained their position throughout the battle.Wing to the foggy character of the day our artillery on the left bank of thea Ppahannock was obliged to fire somewhat at random, and for the same reasone fire from the enemy’s batteries was not very well directed. The contest^ e d at nightfall, our troops having made no material permanent advance,he military reader will see that had Meade and Gibbon had behind them,s ^ ei1 they carried the enemy’s lines, the 25,000 men of the Sixth Corps in-

regiments, simply, of the Third Corps, the probabilities would all

the

P

Ust which would have attacked with the

® s iv y" 01 ! 18 ' Had the necessary orders been re-hav e d even hy midnight, the movements wouldtl le een made under cover of the darkness, andr * night after midnight would have beenBu ri) r ?~ 1° make them. It seems that Generalteach) 1 6 Wen *' 1° bed as soon as he arrived at histh 6 n qUarte «, and did not write the orders untilSe n t t l ? OT ’hng. None of my urgent messageshita ?, tim during the night were delivered toact,l ,h°ugh their receipt at headquarters wasfc’edged.

Bq rn .*1 he seen that the order sent by Generalhe under which the attack was made is

entirely different from that for an attack by fortythousand men, which I had a right to expect fromwhat took place at our interview of the previousevening. And its receipt at 7 : 45 in the morning[it was dated 5:55 A. m.], instead of midnight,was unaccountable, except under the suppositionthat Burnside, for some reason that was unknownto us on the left, disapproved of the plan to whichwe thought he had assented, or that no serious at-tack wastobemade from the left. —W. B. Franklin.

■fe It came into action shortly after Meade’s ad-vance, to repel a threatened attack from a largeforce of cavalry which developed between our leftand the Massaponax Creek.— W. B. Franklin.