38

FRANKLIN’S “LEFT GRAND DIVISION.”

On Monday afternoon (the 15tli) I received an order from General Franklin,then detained at headquarters, to withdraw the Left Grand Division afterdark to the left bank of the river, and what remained of the forty thousandmen of that command recrossed during the night without loss and withoutmolestation from the enemy.

After the battle I had four interviews with Burnside. The first was onSunday, the 14th of December. I found him alone in his tent walking upand down, apparently in great distress of mind, and turning to me he said,“Oh! those men! oh! those men!” I asked what he meant, and lie said,“ Those men over there!” pointing across the river where so many thousandslay dead and wounded, “ 1 am thinking of them all the time.”

I made some remark about the fate of soldiers and changed the subject.Burnside also said that he did not lead the Ninth Corps to the charge as hehad said he would, because the generals on the right made such statements withreference to the demoralization of their commands that he feared to makethe attempt. After we had recrossed the river I saw him again, when he toldme that he had it in his mind to relieve Sumner from command, place Hookerin arrest, and Franklin in command of the army.

In the third interview General Reynolds was with me. Burnside saidthat the men on the left did not fight well enough. To this we replied thatthe list of killed and wounded proved the contrary. He then said, “ I didnot mean that; I meant there were not muskets enough fired,” adding, “ Imade a mistake in my order to Franklin; I should have directed him to carrythe hill at Hamilton’s at all hazards.” ☆

At the fourth interview he stated that the mistake was that Franklin didnot get the order early enough; that he had started it at 4 o’clock in themorning, but that General Hardie, to whom the order was committed, hadstopped an hour and a half in camp to get breakfast. I then told him thatwe should have had the order before midnight in order to form such a columnof attack as we had proposed.

For a few days General Burnside was dazed by the defeat and grief-strickenat the loss of life; but he soon recovered, and planned and attempted to carryout his harmless “ Mud Campaign,” his last at the head of the Army of thePotomac.

■&The Committee on the Conduct of the Wavreceived from General Burnside responses to ques-tions as follows:

Q. “ Do I understand you to say that you expectedGeneral Franklin to carry the point at the extreme leftof the ridge in the rear of the town, and thereby enableour troops to storm and carry their fortifications l”

A. “ I did expect him to carry that point; which beingdone would have placed our forces in rear of their ex-treme right, and winch I thought at the time would shake

their forces to such an extent that the position in frontcould he easily stormed and carried.”

Q. “ To what do you attribute his failure to accompli ® 11tliatl”

A. "To the great strength of the position, and tb eaccumulation of the enemy’s forces there.”

General Burnside then explained that the delayin building the bridges gave the enemy time toaccumulate his forces before ho was able to orde rthe attack.— W. B. Franklin.