164

THE CHAN CELLO RSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

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his right flank perpendicular to the old one and barely half a mile to theright of Chancellorsville. Sickles was retired, with the two columns, from hisadvanced position in the afternoon to near where Pleasonton had had liisencounter, before mentioned, some distance to the left of the new line of ourright flank and close up to the enemy. The situation was thought to be avery critical one by General Hooker, who had simply a strong body in frontof the enemy, but without supports, at least near enough to be used forthat purpose. At the same time it was a menace to Jackson’s right wingor flank. Before midnight some of the latter’s enterprising men pushedforward and actually cut off Sickles ’s line of communication. When thisnews was carried to Hooker it caused him groat alarm, and preparation®were at once made to withdraw the whole front, leaving General Sickles tohis fate; but that officer showed himself able to take care of his rear, for hoordered after a little while a column of attack, and communication wasrestored at the point of the bayonet.

The situation of Jackson’s corps on the morning of May 3d was a desperateone, its front and right flank being in the presence of not far from 25,000men, with the left flank subject to an assault of 30,000, the corps of Meade andReynolds, by advancing them to the right, where the thicket did not presentan insurmountable obstacle. It only required that Hooker should bracehimself up to take a reasonable, common-sense view of the state of things*when the success gained by Jackson would have been turned into an over-whelming defeat. But Hooker became very despondent. I think that hisbeing outgeneraled by Lee had a good deal to do with his depression. Aft e1 ’the right flank had been established on the morning of the 3d by Sickle ®