THE CHANCELLORS HILLE CAMPAIGN.

171

At 12 o’clock on the night of the 4th-5th General Hooker assembled hisCor Ps commanders in council. Meade, Sickles, Howard, Reynolds, and my-Se lf were present; General Slocum, on account of the long distance from

his

post, did not arrive until after the meeting was broken up. Hooker

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®^ted that his instructions compelled him to cover Washington, not to3 e opar ( li ze the army, etc. It was seen by the most casual observer that he

had

made up his mind to retreat. We were left by ourselves to consult,

^Pon which Sickles made an elaborate argument, sustaining the views of theCommanding general. Meade was in favor of fighting, stating that hemibted if we could get oft our guns. Howard was in favor of fighting,d'lalif'ying his views by the remark that our present situation was due to thea d conduct of his corps, or words to that effect. Reynolds, who was lying011 the ground very much fatigued, was in favor of an advance. I had® l milar views to those of Meade as to getting off the guns, but said I" r ould favor an advance if I could designate the point of attack.” Uponelecting the suffrages, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted squarely forI? 1 U( ivance, Sickles and myself squarely no; upon which Hooker informede council that he should take upon himself the responsibility of retiring thearill y to the other side of the river. As I stepped out of the tent Reynolds,J^ s t behind me, broke out, “ What was the use of calling us together at this°t* night when he intended to retreat anyhow ? ”

the morning of May 5tli, corps commanders were ordered to cut roads,j, ei ‘ e it was necessary, leading from their positions to the United States °id. During the afternoon there was a very heavy rainfall. In the mean-Ue Hooker had in person crossed the river, but, as he gave orders for thetl /ious corps to march at such and such times during the night, I am not awarea t any of his corps generals knew of his departure. Near midnight I gotlQ tc from Meade informing me that General Hooker was on the other sidee Ut^ 16 r * ver ’ w hicli i ia( i risen over the bridges, and that communication wasj- ' °ff from him. I immediately rode over to Hooker’s headquarters andthat I was in command of the army, if it had any commander. General°f the artillery, had brought the information as to the condition of thedges, and from the reports there seemed to be danger of losing them^ l ’°ly. After a short conference with Meade I told him that the recrossing0 be suspended, and that “we would stay where we were and fight its iu’ re ^ Ur] d u g to my tent with the intention of enjoying what I had not had^ti' 6 ^ ie u *»ht the 30th ultimo — a good sleep; but at 2 a. m., communi-011 having been reestablished, I received a sharp message from Hooker,s „° v der the recrossing of the army as he had directed, and everything wasj y transferred to the north bank of the Rappahannock.

^°khig for the causes of the loss of Cliancellorsville, the primary ones

hi

that Hooker expected Lee to fall back without risking battle. Finding} J( , mistaken he assumed the defensive, and was outgeneraled and1 ,fl e demoralized by the superior tactical boldness of the enemy.