THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

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General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg , and at 2 o’clock on the morning of May2d the First Corps was also ordered up to Chancellorsville, leaving Sedgwick^ith the Sixth Corps. These movements did not escape the attention of Gen-®ral Lee, so he decided to assume the offensive and put in operation the plan^diieh had been suggested by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill , Ewell, and Stuarta t their council of war in the first week in March. He left a sufficient forceat Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick, while with the bulk of his army heProved on Chancellorsville, sending a force under Generals Jackson, A. P. ^dl, and Stuart, to make a turning movement and to attack the Unionf°i’ces in the rear and right flank, and roll them up. Lee himself, in theMeantime, with the remainder of his forces, occupied the attention ofdie left and center of Hooker’s army, to prevent any interference withdie flank movement. General Lee’s strategy was the same that HookerJa< l carried out so successfully until he stopped at Chancellorsville. Lee"^as equally successful in his movements, and we will now investigate theCa Uses of his failure to give the Army of the Potomac a crushing blow.

On the 2d day of May the right of the Army of the Potomac was theEleventh Corps, in the woods near Dowdall’s Tavern (Melzi Chancellor’s); the.hird Corps connected it with the Twelfth Corps at Fairview and Cliancellors-^de, facing south toward the woods; while the Second and the Fifth corps^ ere posted to prevent any attack taking the position in the rear and flankI(, iii the east. Throughout the morning of the 2d of May, attacks were made011 different portions of our line from the east to the w T est. These attacks° e eurred at intervals of an hour or more, but always farther to the west. I^ as satisfied this was done to withdraw our attention from the real point ofa dack, and I mentioned this to Hooker, who had become more and more im-U-’essed with the belief that the information contained in the diary of Stuart’s6a gineer officer was correct, and that Lee had adopted a plan to carry it out.

I 11 the afternoon of May 2d General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps,tv!* 1 ? w °rd that the enemy were retreating toward Gordonsville, and thatkeir wagons and artillery could be seen passing by the Furnace road somem’ee miles to the south. General Hooker sent for me on receiving thisle Port, and stated that he was not sure the enemy -were retreating; that heRanted an officer of experience in that part of the field, and that he washed me.? take my command there and keep him promptly informed of everythinga t Was going on. I asked h im if he considered me to be under the orders of

1 - 7— He replied quickly, w You are under my orders only; use yourJudgment in doing whatever you think ought to be done.”

fay one.

3st judg_

tli^ n an ‘iving at Hazel Grove, about one mile from Chancellorsville, I foundtli ^ euera l Sickles was moving two of the divisions of the Third Corps inthe ^ rec ^ on °t Catherine Furnace, and shortly after he became engagedth 16 a strong rear-guard. Hazel Grove was the highest ground in

Neighborhood and was the key of our position, and I saw that if Lee’ses gained it the Army of the Potomac would be worsted,th e . tlei at Sickles wanted some cavalry to protect his flanks, and I gave him6 6th New York. This left me with only the 8th and 17th Pennsylvania