BY E. E. COLSTON, MAJOR-GENEEAL, C. S. A.
TJhe assertion that Hooker’s move upon Chan-cellorsville was a surprise to General Lee isa great mistake. Every day Lee had informationHooker’s movements. The following letter,sent hy Lee to Jackson, and hy the latter to me,has never been out of my possession since. Itshows the remarkable intuition that enabledGeneral Lee on so many occasions to foresee andPenetrate the intentions of his antagonist. In this°ase a demonstration had been made on our ex-treme right at Port Royal, and without waitinglor orders I had gone with a brigade and battery tola eet it. I reported the facts to General Jackson,ail( l it is my letter to him to which Lee refers:
“Headquarters, A. N. Va., April 23, 1863. Lieut.-wExy Jackson, Com’g Corps. Gisn’l: 1 have
ecoived General Colston's letter ot 856 o’clock to-dayrhieli you forwarded to me. I think from the accountSiven me by L’t-Col. Smith, of the Engineers , who wasPort Royal yesterday, of the enemy’s operationshere, the day and night previous, that his present, pur-I'oso is to draw our troops in that direction while hoattempts a passage elsewhere. I would not, then, sendown more troops than are actually necessary. I willotify Geu’ls McLnws and Anderson to be on the alert,I think that if a real attempt is made to cross thef I ' Rr it will be above Fredericksburg . Very respect-ul ly, R. IS. Lee , Gen’i.”
The letter was indorsed by Jackson, “Respect-u Uy referred to General Colston for his guidance.”J' w as also marked “confidential,” and both the<i r °nt and the back of the envelope were markedprivate,” so that not even my adjutant-generalhould open it in case of my absence.
The Federal writers have wondered why Jack-®°u’s corps did not complete its work on the even-of May 2d. They do not realize the conditionJ °ur troops after tlieir successful charge ontoward. We had forced our way through brushdense that the troops were nearly stripped ofheir uniforms. Brigades, regiments, and com-P a hies had become so mixed that they could not6 handled ; besides which the darkness of even-ts Was so intensified by the shade of the dense°ods that nothing could be seen a few yards off.16 halt at that time was not a mistake, but a^®°©ssity. So far from intending to stop, Jackson,hen he was wounded, was hurrying A. P. Hill ’slv ision to the front to take the place of Rodes’s
and mine and to continue the attack; A. P. Hill wasalso wounded soon afterward, and the advance ofhis troops in the narrow road on which alone theycould move was checked by the shell and canisterof twelve Napoleon guns, from an elevation withinfive hundred yards. The slaughter and confusionwere greatly increased by this terrible fire in thenight, so that the pause in the attack was one ofthose fatalities of war that no foresight can prevent.
It was about 1 o’clock on Sunday, May 3d,that Lee received information that Early had beendriven from Marye’s Heights and was falling backbefore Sedgwick. Jackson’s corps, which hadbeen fighting since 6 o’clock the previous even-ing, with very little rest during the night, renew-ing the conflict at daylight, and capturing thepositions at Chancellorsville, was much diminishedby casualties and much exhausted by fatigue, hun-ger, and thirst; but it was preparing to move uponHooker’s last line of intreueliments, erected dur-ing the night on very strong positions. My divis-ion was in the lead in line of battle. It was thenthat I received an order to report at once in per-son to General Lee . I found liim standing in asmall tent pitched by tlie roadside. His plaingray sack-coat, with only three stars on the rollingcollar, was, like his face, well sprinkled with thedust of the battle-field. In low, quiet tones hesaid to me: “General, I wish you to advancewitli your division oil the United States Ford road.I expect you will meet with resistance before youcome to the bend of the road. I do not want youto attack the enemy’s positions, but only to feelthem. Send your engineer officer with skirmishersto the front to reconnoiter and report. Don’tengage seriously, but keep tlie enemy in check andprevent him from advancing.”
I am confident that these were almost the exactwords of General Lee , to which he added, “ Moveat once,” which I did. I was not a little puzzledat the time (not knowing the situation at Fred-ericksburg ), and I wondered why we were not tocontinue our advance and hurl Hooker into theriver. Lee left the field at Chancellorsville imme-diately after giving me the above orders, and hast-ened to Early’s support with McLaws ’s division,Mahone’s brigade, and other troops, and compelledSedgwick to retreat across the Rappahannock.
the opposing forces in the chancellorsville
CAMPAIGN.
® 1 composition, losses, and strength of each army as hero stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Officialecoi ‘ds. k stands for killed; w for wounded ; in w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.
THE UNION ARMY.
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.— Major-General Joseph Hooker . Staff loss: w, 1.
Guard, Brig.-Gen. MursenaR. Patrick: 93d N. Capt. Alonzo Snow; 21st N Y., Lieut.-Col. Chester W.’ Julm s. Crocker; E and I, nth Pa. Cay., Capt. Sternberg; 23d N. Y., Col. Henry C. Iloffman; 35th N.Jw * s tniT; 8th IT. 8. (6 co’s), Capt. E. W. IT. Read; Y., Col. John G. Todd; 80 th N. Y. ( 20 th Militia), Col.~P<Ur • Regular Cav., Lieut . Tattnall Paulding. Theodore B. Gates; 12 th Ohio Battery, Capt. Aaron C.
lCc ' s Brigade, Col. William F. Rogers: B, Md. Art’y, Johnson. Engineer Brigade , Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Ben-V °R- iri. 16
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