HOOKER’S APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL.

4i

^ as a keen lawyer, and the reluctant generals anda n-otIicers had but poor success in stopping any-where short of the whole truth. When he gota ck to his post, a conference of the President and®°retary of War with himself was held at theoar Department, whereat it was concluded thatot a the check at Chancellorsville and the retreat®re inexcusable, and that Hooker must not be in-rus ted with the conduct of another battle. Hal-had brought a message from Hooker to the“ect that as he had never sought the command,6 °ould resign it without embarrassment, and°uld be only too happy if, in the new arrange-61 >t, he could have the command of his oldision and so keep in active service.

"he friends of Mr. Chase considered that the. unes of their leader were too much bound upnh Hooker to permit of the latter’s ignominiousJ^oval and, although the President had learnedUe h that lie did not dream of at the time her ’' e 4 company with the War Department in theip t ''er of appointing a successor to Burnside, ther easury faction had grown so powerful that heu Jd not consent to a rupture with it, and a tem-

lln g policy was adopted all around, which

h°riz

j^heral Couch ", commander of the Second Corps,Unconsciously, nearly spoiled by contemptu-(jg S . fusing to serve any longer under Hooker,, s pite an abject appeal to him by Hooker not toea ye the army. J)

cneral Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania brokethe nearly intolerable situation, and Hooker’s^ent and skillful management of his armyMly brought matters back to the hopeful state

they were in before the late battle. \ But Mr. Stan-ton was determined that the deliberate decisionof the council of war, held after Halleck's returnfrom the front, should not be set aside, and hewas now the master of the situation. Hooker wasso full of hope and energy that severe measureshad to be resorted to in order to wring from himthat tender of resignation deemed to be necessaryto enable bis supporters at Washington to keep onoutward terms with the Administration. When itdid come, the impending battle was evidently soclose at hand that the Secretary of War was seizedwith the fear that, either by accident or design,the change of command to General Meade wouldnot be effected in time to avoid the very contin-gency aimed at by the change. At the last mo-ment, the President too became alarmed, andthere was another conference at the Departmentto settle the means of insuring the transfer.

Duplicate copies of the President’s order, chang-ing the command, were made, authenticated by thesignature of the adjutant-general and addressed,severally, to Generals Hooker and Meade . GeneralJames A. Hardie, chief of the staff of the Secretaryof War, and a personal friend of both the officersconcerned, was then called into the conferenceroom and directed to start at once for FrederickCity and, without disclosing his presence or busi-ness, make his way to General Meade and givehim to understand that the order for him to as-sume the command of the army immediately wasintended to be as unquestionable and peremptoryas any that a soldier could receive. He wasthen, as the representative of the President, to

J ^neral F. A. Walker says in his “History of theIt 011(1 Army Corps ” (pp. 253-255):

c han* le -°^ * l10 of the Chancellnrsville campaign waa a

hi the command of the Second Corps. General Couch the p ^ Mitraged in every nerve and liber of his being byit a y.' 0,u hict of General Hooker from the 1st to the 5th of

that General Couch was alone in this feeling, whichShared’ - - - • — • •

0, »Ci

by nearly all the commanders of the army; butat

, e . nature as a man and bis position as the senior corps

t(i Se '^^hir made him peculiarly the spokesman in the rop-. . 4 tationsand remonstrances addressed to General Hooker,when consulted by President Lincoln on the 22d ofa, lviscd that General Meade should be placed in com-ftervi,’ ( Hta ting that lie himself would have great pleasure inhnder that olllcer, though senior to him. To the sug-his own succession to the command GenernlCouch** j ll ^d a firm and sincere negative. . . .

Pai, this spirit, [having lost, confidence in Hooker], withfurj.j ^^bressible, General Couch asked to be relieved from1 service with the Army of the Potomac.”— Editors.

b a . e G 11 the 5th of Jane General Hooker sent to theon (,ll t a long dispatch, to which Mr. Lincoln repliedW- «ame day. These communications throw an

bite:

..........xx... «...x

st. . 011 Hooker’s relations with the Ad-

ui)o ut l ' u ti°n. After stating liis suspicion that Lee wasto undertake an aggressive movement, Hooker

tile 1 flm liable to lie called on to make a movement withpav]y host Promptitude, I desire that I may be informed asbig Practicable of the views of the Government concern-^> 11 ,,,, * ll 'niy. Under instructions from the major-general'Hut • Brth0 arm V« dated January 31st, I am instructed to? ll d j.j, lv ^ 0w always the importance of covering Washingtont ^do 1 ? 01 ' 8 Forr ‘ V » either directly or by so operating as tohi tha P u, iiMh any force of the enemy sent against them.’

•Wii] ftVp ' 11 t the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate^^arfl t head of his column will probably beheadedthe Potomac, via Gordonsville or Culpeper, while

the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving thesubject my best reflection, I am of opinion that it is my dutyto pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of hiscolumn may reach Warivnton before I can return. Will it bewithin the spirit of my instructions to do so 1 ? In view ofthese contemplated movements of the enemy, I cannot tooforcibly impress upon the mind of His Excellency, the Presi-dent, the necessity of having one commander for all of thetroops whose operations can have au influence on those ofLee’s anny. Under the present system, all independent com-manders are in ignorance of the movements of the others; atleast such is my situation. I trust that I may not be con-sidered in the way to this arrangement, as it is a position Ido not desire, and only suggest it, as I feel the necessity forconcert as well as vigorous action.' It is necessary for meto say this much that my motives may not be misunderstood.Joseph Hooker, Major-General .”

President Lincoln’s reply is as follows:

“ Washington, Juno 5tJi, 1863, 4 i\ m.— Major-GeneralHooker : Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. Somuch of professional military skill is requisite to answer itthat I have turned the task over to General Halleck. Hepromises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but oneidea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, incase you tind Lee coming to the north of the I-tappahannock,I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he shouldleave a real-force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fallupon it, it would fight in intrenehments and have you at dis-advantage. and so, man for man, worst you at that point,while his main force would in some way be getting an advan-tage of you northward. In one word, I would not take anyrisk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumpedhalf over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and rearwithout a fair chance to goro one way or kick the other. IfLee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on thesame side and fight him or act on the defense, according asmight, bo my estimate of his strength relatively to my own.But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be con-trolled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck. A.Lincoln .”— Editors.