252 THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.
tions Stuart withdrew from the front on the even-ing of the 24th to pass around Hooker, leavingBobertson about Middleburg with 3000 cavalryand 2 batteries of artillery to observe the enemy.Stuart’s success depended upon preserving thestatus quo of the Federal army until he could getthrough it. Hooker was on the defensive waiting forhis adversary to move. It did not seem to occur toGeneral Longstreet that the march of the infantrydown the Shenandoah Valley would disclose all tothe enemy that the cavalry would have done. Itwas no fault of Stuart’s that he was foiled byevents which he could not control. When on themorning of the 25th he reached Hooker’s rear,he found his whole army moving to the Potomacand all the roads occupied by his troops. Thiscompelled a wide detour, and instead of cross-ing the river in advance of the enemy, as he hadexpected, he was two days behind him. Thus allcommunication was broken with Generals Leeand Ewell. The march of Hill’s and Longstreet’scorps on the day before had been in full view ofthe signal stations on Maryland Heights and wastelegraphed to Hooker, who made a correspond-ing movement.
On the morning of June 20tli the enemy disap-peared from Kobertson’s front and crossed thePotomac. In that event his instructions fromStuart were, “to watch the enemy and harass hisrear — to cross the Potomac and follow the army,keeping on its right and rear,” and to “report any-thing of importance to Lieutenant-General Long-street, with whose position you will communicateby relays through Charlestown.”
Robertson retired to the mountain gaps and re-mained until the afternoon of the 29th, when hewas recalled to the army by a courier from GeneralLee. At night on the 28tli General Lee heard,through a scout at Cliambersburg, of Hooker’sadvance. As no information of it had come fromthe cavalry he had left in Hooker’s front in Vir-ginia , he thought that Hooker was still there. He
If you flml that ho Is moving northward, and that twobrigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of yourrear, you can move witli the at her three into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place your-self in communication with him, guard his ilank andkeep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and col-lect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.One column of General Ewell’s army will probably movetoward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, an-other by Cliambersburg. Accounts from him last nightstate that there was no enemy west of Fredoriektown.A cavalry force (about one hundred) guarded the Mono-cacy bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course,take charge of Jenkins’s brigade and give himnecessaryinstructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must lie byauthorized staff-officers for their respective departments,by no one else. They will be paid for or receipts for thesame given to the owners. I will send you a generalorder on this subject, which T wish you to see is strictlycomplied with. I am, very respectfully, your obedientservant, R. E. Eke, General.”
On the following day General Leo wrote as fol-lows :
“ Headquarters, Arm Y OR Northern VIRGINIA, June23d, 1803,5 r. m. Major-General J. E. 11. Htuaiit, Com-manding Cavalry. General : Your notes of 9 and 10:30A. M. to-day have just been received. . . . If General
immediately issued an order for the concentrationat Gettysburg , and sent for Robertson’s command;that had been left, he says, to hold the mountainpasses, “as hug as the enemy remained south ofti ,ePotomac.” It had staid there three days afterthey had gone. As Stuart had been ordered toEwell on the Susquehanna, it could not have beenexpected that he should also watch Hooker on tb®Potomac. Stuart’s instructions to divide tli 0cavalry and take three brigades with him to Ew°b’on the Susquehanna, were peremptory; he w aSonly given discretion as to the point of crossing ^ ,ePotomac. It was therefore immaterial, so fargiving information to Lee was concerned, whetb®*he crossed east or west of the ridge. In either ev eI1they would have been separated and out of com-munication with each other. Lee must then lia verelied on Bobertson or nobody to watch Hooker-
Instead of keeping on the right of the army a,! ,in close contact with the enemy, as Stuart h aordered, Robertson’s command marched on the 10by Martinsburg and did not reach the battle-flm •The rear-guard of the Federal army moving i ]1Pennsylvania crossed the Potomac on June 2Gtb;east of the Blue Bidge; Bobertson crossedWilliamsport , about twenty-five miles to the ice 1 ’of it, on July 1st, the day the fighting beganGettysburg . When General Lee crossed the P°*°mac, ho left General Bobertson between him and tnenemy. By July 3d Bobertson had so manoeuvre^that Leo was between him and the enemy. Stn® 1had ridden around General Hooker while Roberts 0was riding around General Lee. If, in accordanwith Stuart’s instructions, Robertson had promP t1 'followed on the right of the army when the en elll jjleft, Leo’s forces would have been eoneentrat 0 ^and ready for attack; a defensive battle vs’ 0 "have been fought, and Gettysburg might ha'been to Southern hearts something more than a
“ Glorious Held of grief.”
Washington, Feb. 9tli, 1887.
Hooker’s army remains inactive you can leave two h 1 ^gules to watch him and withdraw with the three otk® jbut should he not appear to lie moving northwa 1 ’think you had better withdraw this side of the mom 1 ’ ^to-morrow night, cross at Hhepliordstown next day> a ^ 0move over to Fredoriektown. You will, howeV® r > yable to judge whether you can pass around their at ^without hindrance, doing them all the damage i'° n . t ^ e rand cross the river cast of tlio mountains. In e lf C eicase, after crossing the river, you must move on andthe rigid, of Ewell’s troops, collecting information. 1 ))0visions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of ^ )6brigades left behind to watch the (lank and rear ofarmy and (in event of the enemy leaving their trontgtiro from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, r y
sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing®thing clean along the valley, closing upon the r< ' a y.*L l deSarmy. As regards the movements of the two Wb5 » c rof the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the com®®of the brigades to lie left in the mountains must dolie, can to counteract them ; but I think the sooiie ^pcross into Maryland , after to-morrow, the better. pl -movements of Ewell’s corps are as stated in my 10 ,p-letter. Hill’s first division will reach the PotoW 11 . ^,,,1day, and Longstreet, will follow to-morrow. Be wotand circumspect in all your movements. I am v ! >!•spoctfully and truly yours, H. E. Lee, General.”— '