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returned from Chancellorsville to their camps on the northern bank of theRappahannock, mortified and incensed at finding themselves, through u°fault of their own, in the condition of having in an offensive campaign lostthe battle without fighting, except when the enemy forced it upon them.
Yet in this battle the Northern soldier fought well. Under the circuit'stances no men could have withstood such a sudden attack as that made by“Stonewall” Jackson on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps; but assoon as Jackson encountered troojDs in condition for action, his pursuit waschecked and he was brought to a stand. The panic did not extend beyondthe routed corps, nor to all of that, for its artillery and so much of its infantryas could form a proper line did their duty, and the army, far from being“demoralized” by this mishap, simply ridiculed the corps which, from d ssupposed want of vigilance, had allowed itself to be surprised in a position n 1which it could not fight. The surprise itself was not the fault of the troops*and in subsequent battles the corps redeemed its reputation. Both armieswere composed in the main of Americans, and there was little more differencebetween their men than might be found between those of either armydifferent periods, or under varying circumstances ; for although high bountieshad already brought into the Federal ranks an inferior element which swelledthe muster-rolls and the number of stragglers, “bounty jumping”J had notas yet become a regular business.
The morale of the Confederate army was, however, much higher at tin 8time than that of its adversary. It was composed of men not less patriotic*many of whom had gone into the war with reluctance, but who now felt thatthey were defending their homes. They were by this time nearly all veterans*led by officers having the confidence of their Grovernment, which took pain®to inspire its soldiers with the same feeling. Their successes were extolled andmagnified, their reverses palliated or ignored. Exaggerations as to the rela'tive numbers of the troops had been common enough on both sides, but thoS eindulged in at the South had been echoed, sometimes suggested, in the Noi’ldby a portion of the press and people, so that friends and enemies united 1 11inspiring in the Confederate soldier a belief in himself and a contempt for hiSenemy. I11 the Army of the Potomac it was different; the proportion of vet"erans was much smaller; a cessation of recruiting at the very beginning 0active operations, when men were easily obtainable to supply losses in exist'ing regiments, had been followed, as emergencies arose, by new levies, for sh° rperiods of service, and in new organizations which could not readily be assiffi'dated by older troops. Moreover, there were special difficulties. The Ai -111 ^of the Potomac was not in favor at the War Department . Rarely, if ever, h at ^it heard a word of official commendation after a success, or of sympathy 01encouragement after a defeat. From the very beginning its camps had bee 11filled with imputations and charges against its leaders, who were accused ou-tlie streets, by the press, in Congress, and even in the War Department itset *and after victories as well as after defeats, not only of incapacity or misco 11
$ This term was applied to the practice of enlisting anil securing bounty money, and then, eitherdeserting outright, or shirking the serious work of the field.— Editors.