THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
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es eort duty, guards, and orderlies. It was not until 1863 that it was unitedUnder General Pleasonton in a corps consisting of three weak divisions,Buford’s, D. McM. Gregg’s, and Duffie’s, afterward consolidated into two,Stahel’s cavalry, which joined at Frederick, June 28th, "becoming the thirddivision. The corps was then organized as follows : First Division, Buford:Brigades, Gamble, Devin, Merritt; Second Division, Gregg: brigades, Mcln-i°sh, Huey, J. Irvin Gregg; Third Division, Kilpatrick: brigades, Farns-worth, Custer. The divisions and three of the brigades were commandedBy brigadier-generals, the other five brigades by colonels. To the cavalryWere attached Robertson’s and Tidball’s brigades of horse-artillery. Undere xcellent chiefs and the spirit created by its new organization, the Federalcavalry soon rivaled that of the Confederates.
The field-artillery was in an unsatisfactory condition. The high reputationh had gained in Mexico was followed by the active and persistent hostility°f the War Department , which almost immediately dismounted three-fourths°i its authorized batteries. Congress in 1853 made special provision for^mounting them as schools of instruction for the whole arm, a duty whichBie War Department on shallow pretexts evaded. Again in 1861 Congress fl, Uiply provided for the proper organization and command of the artillery inBie field, but as there was no chief nor special administration for the arm,a Ud no regulations for its government, its organization, control, and directionWere left to the fancies of the various army commanders. General officersWere practically denied it, and in 1862 the War Department announced in°i‘ders that field-officers of artillery were an unnecessary expense and theirUlus ter into service forbidden. Promotion necessarily ceased, and sucha Ble artillerists as Hays, DeRussy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffin, and Ayres could°nly
receive promotion by transfer to the infantry or cavalry. No adequateUieasures were taken for the supply of recruits, and the batteries were fre-quently dependent on the troops to which they were attached for men enoughB* "Work their guns in battle. For battery-draft they were often glad to get there fuse horses after the ambulance and quartermasters’ trains were supplied.‘'Bill, many of the batteries attained a high degree of excellence, due mainlyB J tbe self-sacrifice, courage, and intelligence of their own officers and men.
On taking command of the army, General Hooker had transferred theMilitary command of the artillery to his own headquarters, to be resumed byBu : chief of artillery oidy under specific orders and for special occasions,Which resulted in such mismanagement and confusion at Chancellorsvillethat he consented to organize the artillery into brigades. This was a decidedhuprovement, which would have been greater if the brigade commanders hadheld adequate rank. As it was, there was no artillery commandant-in-chief° 1 ' nionths before the battle of Gettysburg , and of the 14 brigades 4 were^Uutnanded by field-officers, 9 by captains, and 1 by a lieutenant, taken fromheir batteries for the purpose. The number of field-batteries at Gettysburg Was 65, of guns 370, of which 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the cavalry,B in the reserve. The disadvantages under which the artillery labored allU’ough the war, from want of proper regulations, supervision, and command