THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

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communications, Lee would have to scatter his army more or less in order tosubsist it, and so expose it to Meade ; or else keep it united, and so starve!t, a course which Meade could compel by simple demonstrations. There'could then be but two courses for Lee,—either to attack Meade in his chosenposition or to retreat without a battle. The latter, neither the temper ofhis army nor that of his Government would probably permit. I11 case of adefeat Meade ’s line of retreat would be comparatively short, and easily cov-ered, whilst Lee’s would be for two marches through an open country beforehe could gain the mountain passes. As Meade believed Lee’s army to be at leastequal to his own, all the elements of the problem were in favor of the PipeCreek line. But Meade ’s orders for July 1st, drawing his corps toward thethreatened flank, carried Reynolds to Gettysburg , and Buford’s report has-tened this movement. Reynolds, who probably never received the Pipe Creekeucular, was eager for the conflict, and his collision with Heth assuming thedimensions of a battle, caused an immediate concentration of both armies atGettysburg. Prior to this, the assembling of Meade ’s army behind PipeCreek would have been easy, and all fears of injuring thereby the morale ofhis troops were idle; the Army of the Potomac was of “ sterner stuff ” thanthat implies. The battle of July 1 st changed the situation. Overpowered bylumbers, the First and Eleventh corps had, after hard fighting and inflictingas well as incurring heavy losses, been forced back to their reserve, on Ceme-tery Hill, which they still held. To have withdrawn them now would havebeen a retreat, and might have discouraged the Federal, as it certainly wouldhave elated the Confederate troops; especially as injurious reports unjustboth the corps named had been circulated. It would have been to acknowl-e hge a defeat when there was no defeat. Meade therefore resolved to fighta f Gettysburg. A11 ominous dispatch from General Halleck to Meade , thata fternoon, suggesting that whilst his tactical arrangements were good, hisstrategy was at fault, that he was too far east, that Lee might attempt toturn his left, and that Frederick was preferable as a base to Westminster,Aay have confirmed Meade in this decision.

Iu pursuance of his instructions, I had that morning (July 1 st) reconnoi-tred the country behind Pipe Creek for a battle-ground. On my return I^'° u ud General Hancock at General Meade ’s tent. He informed me that Rey-nolds was killed, that a battle was going on at Gettysburg , and that he wasnuder orders to proceed to that place. His instructions were to examine ita nd the intermediate country for a suitable field, and if his report was favor-njJo the troops would be ordered forward. Before the receipt that evening ofHancock’s written report from Cemetery Hill, which was not very encouraging,General Meade received from others information as to the state of affairs at ther °nt, set his troops in motion toward Gettysburg , afterward urged them toorced marches, and under his orders I gave the necessary instructions to theArtiU ei .y Reserve and Park for a battle there. The move was, under the cir-^Attstances, a bold one, and Meade , as we shall see, took great risks. We leftaiJ uytown toward 11 p. m., and reached Gettysburg after midnight. Soona Her, General Meade, accompanied by General Howard and myself, inspected