THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

2 93

our lines so far as then occupied, after which he directed me to examinethem again in the morning, and to see that the artillery was properly posted.He had thus recognized my “ command ” of the artillery; indeed, he did notknow it had been suspended. I resumed it, therefore, and continued it to theend of the battle.

At the close of July 1st Johnson’s and Anderson’s divisions of the Confed-erate army were up. Ewell’s corps now covered our front from Benner’sHill to the Seminary, his line passing through the town—Johnson on theleft, Early in the center, Bodes on the right. Hill’s corps occupied SeminaryRidge, and during the next morning extended its line from the Seminarysouth nearly to the Peach Orchard on the Emmitsburg road; Trimble —viceRender, wounded—on the left; Anderson on the right; Pettigrew— vice Heth,bounded—in reserve. Of Longstreet’s corps, McLaws ’s division and Hood’s—except Law’s brigade not yet up—camped that night on Marsh Creek, fourmiles from Gettysburg. His Beserve Artillery did not reach Gettysburg Until 9 a. m. of the 2d. Pickett’s division had been left at Chambersburg asrear-guard, and joined the corps on the night of the 2d.

It had not been General Lee ’s intention to deliver a general battle whilst sofar from his base, unless attacked, but he now found himself by the mereforce of circumstances committed to one. If it mnst take place, the soonerHie better. His army was now nearly all on the ground, and delay, whilst itcould not improve his own position, would certainly better that of his antag-°idst. Longstreet, indeed, urged General Lee instead of attacking to turnkleade’s left, and by interposing between him and Washington and threaten-ing his communications, to force him to attack the Confederate army in posi-tion; but General Lee probably saw that Meade would be under no suchnecessity; would have no great difficulty in obtaining supplies, and—disre-garding the clamor from Washington—could play a waiting game, which it'could be impossible for Lee to maintain in the open country. He could notadvance on Baltimore or Washington with Meade in his rear, nor could hisarmy subsist itself in a hostile region which would soon swarm with addi-tional enemies. His communications could be cut off, for his recommenda-tion to assemble even a small army at Culpeper to cover them and aid himkad not been complied with.

A battle was a necessity to Lee , and a defeat would be more disastrous tokteade, and less so to himself, at Gettysburg than at any point east of it.'With the defiles of the South Mountain range close in his rear, which couldke easily held by a small force, a safe retreat through the Cumberland Yalley^as assured, so that his army, once through these passes, would be practi-cally on the banks of the Potomac, at a point already prepared for crossing.jHiy position east of Gettysburg would deprive him of these advantages. Itis more probable that General Lee was influenced by cool calculation of thisMature than by hot blood, or that the opening success of a chance battle hadHu'own him off his balance. Whatever his reasons, he decided to accept theS a ge of battle offered by Meade, and to attack as soon as practicable. Ewellkad made arrangements to take possession of Culp’s Hill in the early morn-