THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

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Were well out on the right flank, from which, after a brush with Stuart onthe evening of the 2d, Kilpatrick was sent next morning to replace Buford,Merritt being also ordered up to our left.

The morning was a busy and in some respects an anxious one; it wasbelieved that the whole Confederate army was assembled, that it was equalnot superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commencebefore our troops were up. There was a gap in Slocum’s line awaiting adivision of infantry, and as some demonstrations of Ewell about daylight indi-cated an immediate attack at that point, I had to draw batteries from otherParts of the line — for the Artillery Reserve was just then starting fromTaneytown — to cover it until it could be properly filled. Still there was nohostile movement of the enemy, and General Meade directed Slocum to holdhimself in readiness to attack Ewell with the Fifth and Twelfth, so soon asthe Sixth Corps should arrive. After an examination Slocum reported theground as unfavorable, in which Warren concurred and advised against anattack there. The project was then abandoned, and Meade postponed all°ffensive operations until the enemy’s intentions should be more clearly devel-°Ped. In the meantime he took precautionary measures. It was clearly nowt° his advantage to fight the battle where he was, and he had some apprehen-Sl °n that Lee would attempt to turn his flank and threaten his communi-cations,—just what Longstreet had been advising. In this case it might beNecessary to fall back to the Pipe Creek line, if possible, or else to follow^ce’s movement into the open country. In either case, or in that of a forcedWithdrawal, prudence dictated that arrangements should be made in advance,a nd General Meade gave instructions for examining the roads and commu-nications, and to draw up an order of movement, which General Butterfield,^hc chief-of-staff, seems to have considered an order absolute for the with-drawal of the army without a battle.

These instructions must have been given early in the morning, for Generalutter field states that it was on his arrival from Taneytown, which place hee it at daylight. An order was drawn up accordingly, given to the adjutant-gdieral, and perhaps prepared for issue in case of necessity to corps com-nianders ; but it was not recorded nor issued, nor even a copy of it preserved.e Heral Meade declared that he never contemplated the issue of such an

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®i der unless contingencies made it necessary; and his acts and dispatchesning the day were in accordance with his statement. There is one circum-pertainiug to my own duties which to my mind is conclusive, and I

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^ e late it because it may have contributed to the idea that General Meade j'dended to withdraw from Gettysburg . He came to me that morning before16 Artillery Reserve had arrived, and, therefore, about the time that the0l der was in course of preparation, and informed me that one of the army^°ips had left its whole artillery ammunition train behind it, and that othersere also deficient, notwithstanding his orders on that subject. He was veryb disturbed, and feared that, taking into account the large expenditurethe preceding day by the First and Eleventh corps, there would not beiheient to carry us through the battle. This was not the first nor the lastV ° L - iii. 20